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Stakeholder Perceptions of the Gulf of Mexico Grouper and Tilefish
Individual Fishing Quota Program

Britni N. Tokotch
Abstract

Individual Fishing Quota Programs (IFQs) are a fishery management
method in which percentages of a fishery are allocated to individual fishers, thus
specifying how much of that species each fisher can harvest. The purpose of
this study is to determine the opinions of stakeholders to the recently
implemented Gulf of Mexico grouper and tilefish IFQ program. Many studies
have been conducted on the biological implications of IFQ programs but few
have focused on social perceptions. Data was obtained through mail-in surveys
and analysis consisted of two-sample two-tailed t-test and two-sample proportion
testing. Results show that a stakeholder’s perspective on the IFQ program is
related to whether or not the stakeholder is an active participant. Also influencing
perception was a commercial fisher’s degree of involvement (size of their fishing
operations). To a lesser degree, gear type and role within the commercial
fisheries also played a part in shaping commercial fisher opinions.
v

Introduction

Fish have always been a staple in the diets of the world’s population.
Similarly, supplying fish has created millions of jobs. It is estimated that 200
million people receive their income from fishing or fishing-related activities all
over the world and the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) estimates that
fish caught throughout the world is worth $80 billion every year (Dolsak and
Ostrom, 2003). Throughout recent history, however, many fish species have not
been sustainably harvested. Due to an increase in fishing power and technology,
the global scale of fishing increased well over 300% in the 40 years between
1952 (18.5 million metric tons) and 1992 (82.5 million metric tons) (Dolsak and
Ostrom, 2003). By the end of the twentieth century, 60% of the top 200 marine
fisheries in the world were considered either fully exploited or over-exploited
(Dolsak and Ostrom, 2003). Modern technologies have made it easier for fishers
to exploit the world’s marine resources at rates higher than stocks are able to
replenish themselves (Kearney, 2001).
There have been many attempts to manage fisheries throughout the
world, such as buyback programs, gear and seasonal restrictions, limited access
programs, just to name a few. However, a different method has come to the
forefront of fishery management. Individual fishing quota programs (IFQs) have
1

gained popularity among many fishery managers, especially in the United States.
As with previous management tools, social perceptions are important to the
success or failure of these programs. Stakeholder opinions can influence how
well new rules are received in the general public as well as how well those
impacted comply with these new rules. A proper understanding of how IFQs are
perceived can help fishery managers adjust their actions in order to better design
or correct measures. This study helps demonstrate the perceptions of
stakeholders to the newly implemented grouper and tilefish IFQ program in the
Gulf of Mexico.
Fishery management received little attention until 1954, when H. Scott
Gordon published an article in the Journal of Political Economy in which he
outlined the common property characteristics of fisheries (Gordon, 1954;
Dewees, 1998). Ever since, ocean managers have searched for efficient
measures that would lead to sustainable use of the nation’s fisheries. Initially,
authorities used input controls such as net mesh sizes, seasonal restrictions,
vessel size restrictions, gear restrictions, and so forth (McCay, 1995; Gibbs,
2007). These approaches did not yield the results that some managers thought
necessary to protect fishery stocks so they set out to find other ways to limit effort
and regulate fisheries.
As a result of Gordon’s article, some economists argued that many fishery
problems were triggered by the lack of property rights. They explained that, as
with many other common resources, some stakeholders will be inclined to
harvest fish as quickly as possible with no regard to the future because there is
2

no guarantee that those fish will be there to catch later. To some people,
catching many fish in the present is more valuable than leaving fish in the water
for later consumption. Anderson (1995, 167-168) explains that the ultimate result
would be a “fish stock that is too small and a fishing capacity that is too large”.
The lack of property rights often motivates fishers to compete against each other
for fish. This competition usually results in overcapitalization within the industry
which, in turn, leads to over exploitation of the resource (Dewees, 1998; Dolsak
and Ostrom, 2003). In fisheries management, this is known as derby fishing and
often leads to the “race for the fish” where fishers rush out to sea hoping to catch
as much fish as possible while they still can. This race motivates fishers to invest
in gear that increases their odds of catching the fish before others, leading not
only to depletion of stocks but also increased fishing costs (Leal, 2002).
In the 1960s, economists first promoted limited access programs that were
designed to restrict the number of vessels and manpower on the water (Squires
et al, 1995). These programs gave only certain fishers license to utilize a specific
fishery. These licenses were often used in conjunction with other fisheries
management measures such as catch limits and gear restrictions (Leal, 2002).
But limited access programs failed to put a stop to overcrowding,
overcapitalization, and overexploitation because they did not eliminate existing
permits. Rather than reducing the number of fishers allowed to participate in the
fishery, these programs simply provided existing vessels an opportunity to
maintain their fishing practices (Leal, 2002).
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Another possible solution was thought to be buy back programs, in which
managers tried to eliminate excessive participants from the fishing industry by
compensating them for leaving the fishery, essentially buying their permits. In
1968, both limited access and buy back programs were attempted in British
Columbia but were failures (Copes, 1986), because the buy back program
removed vessels that accounted for only 5% of the catch – an insignificant
percentage compared to the vessels left in operation. In addition, Copes (1986)
explains that the remaining vessels in the fishery obtained better technology that
allowed them to dramatically increase their capacity (known as “capital stuffing”).
In 1976, the United States Congress passed the Fishery Conservation and
Management Act (later known as the Magnuson-Stevens Act) in which they
mandated a national approach for managing and conserving fishery resources,
including maximizing the sustainable yield of U.S. fisheries. Congress gave the
responsibility for reaching these goals to eight regional fishery management
councils – New England, Mid-Atlantic, South Atlantic, Gulf of Mexico, North
Pacific, Pacific Fishery, Western Pacific, and Caribbean. In coordination with the
National Marine Fisheries Service, a division of the U.S. Department of
Commerce, regional councils develop, monitor and amend fishery management
plans for fisheries within federally managed waters, known as the Exclusive
Economic Zone (EEZ) (National Research Council, 1999).
Some scientists argue that the reason earlier methods did not effectively
manage fisheries was two-fold: 1) they increased the cost of fishing and 2) they
did not address the problems of open access fishing – the race for the fish and
4

harvesting fish regardless of their future benefit (Anderson, 1995). As a result of
failing to control the inputs to a fishery, economists turned to limiting the outputs.
The first idea used to manage outputs was to impose a total allowable
catch (TAC), the total amount of fish that can be harvested by fishers each
fishing year. The National Marine Fisheries Service and other management
agencies regularly complete stock assessments in which they estimate the
abundance and health of marine fish stocks. Using these stock assessments
they are able to determine an allowable biological catch. An allowable biological
catch is a management threshold dictating the amount of fish that can be
harvested and still leave a sufficient population to replenish a particular stock.
Managers are then able to set the TAC for a specific sector within a fishery using
the allowable biological catch and the percentage of harvest/mortality allocated to
a particular sector (National Research Council, 1999; Squires et al, 1995). For
instance, the Gulf of Mexico Fishery Management Council completes stock
assessments of red snapper to determine the maximum sustainable levels at
which that species can be harvested based on estimated population levels. The
Council determines an appropriate allowable catch based on that stock
assessment. Using the allowable biological catch (ABC) as a guideline, the
Council then sets the TAC at a level somewhere below the ABC, clearly defining
the total amount of red snapper that is allowed to be harvested that fishing year.
A species’ total allowable catch is dynamic and reviewed on a regular
basis (usually annually). Indeed, managing fisheries based on a TAC requires
strict monitoring of landings (Squires et al, 1995). Once the year’s TAC for a
5

sector has been reached, managers may close the fishery and prohibit fishers
from harvesting those species for the remainder of the year (Copes, 1986). The
annual TAC often creates problems because it increases pressure for fishers to
race one another to harvest the most fish before the season ends. Alternatively,
managers could divide the TAC into individual quotas (Copes, 1986). With a set
quota, each individual would no longer feel the need to rush out and exploit the
fishery before the season closed. They could harvest fish in a way that best suits
their operation.

6

Individual Fishing Quotas

An Individual fishing quota (IFQ) program, sometimes referred to as an
individual transferable quota (ITQ) program, is a “rights-based” management
method that evolved from the notion that common property characteristics of
fisheries are the largest hurdles to properly managing a healthy, sustainable
fishery (McCay, 1995). The National Marine Fisheries Service defines an IFQ as
“a type of limited access privilege program (LAPP), which provides individual
fishermen or corporations the exclusive privilege to harvest a certain percentage
of the total allowable catch of a fishery” (NMFS, 2009a, 1). Participants in an IFQ
program are granted the permission to harvest a certain amount of a managed
species during a fishing year. This permission is not to be confused with a natural
“right” to fish. The Magnuson-Stevens Act (1976) clearly defines participation in
an IFQ program as a “grant of permission” that can be revoked, limited, or
modified at any time (NMFS, 2007, 79).
Within an IFQ program, the officiating agency is required to set and
enforce regulations, including the annual quota allocated to fishers, gear
restrictions, seasonal closures, and so forth. The participants, however, greatly
influence the amount of fish they harvest because IFQ shares are transferable
(National Research Council 1999). IFQs can be used as both preventative and
responsive actions, meaning they can be utilized before a fishery has undergone
overharvest or as a way to mitigate damages caused by overcapitalization.
According to Arnason (2009), over 10 nations use IFQs as a large part of
managing their fisheries, and between 10% and 15% of the world’s ocean catch
7

is harvested under IFQ programs. Scientists argue that these programs are
successful ways to conserve fish stocks because they set a limit on the total
harvest of a species for a specified amount of time (Dolsak and Ostrom, 2003).
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Benefits of IFQs

The major goals of an IFQ program are to reduce fishing effort, increase
efficiency, and reduce overcapitalization within the fishery (McCay, 1995; Dolsak
and Ostrom, 2003; National Research Council, 1999). The fundamental ideas
behind IFQ programs increase the potential for fishery managers to achieve
those goals. Management actions (such as IFQ programs) that control access to
a fishery allow authorities to restrict the annual harvest as well as reduce the total
cost of fishing (Anderson, 1995; Squires et al, 1998). This is based on the idea
that fishers will use more selective gear and change their fishing practices (i.e.
make better financial and practical decisions, use proper handling methods, and
so forth) if they are given rights to a certain amount of fish (Dolsak and Ostrom,
2003; National Research Council, 1999). Moreover, instead of feeling like they
must race out to sea to fish, even in the face of dangerous weather, fishers will
be more selective about when and where they fish. IFQ programs also provide
incentives for fishers to increase self enforcement (ensuring other participants do
not violate regulations thus providing an advantage that other law-abiding
participants would not benefit from) and adjust their harvest to coincide with
allotted quotas (Branch et al, 2006). Under traditional management programs,
which focus on the TAC for an entire region, fishers often feel obligated to take
as much fish as they can as quickly as they can for fear of others harvesting the
regional quota before the season closes. An IFQ program reduces stress on
fishers because individuals know that they have a set amount of fish they can
harvest throughout the year and that other fishers are also limited by a quota.
9

This allows fishers to better choose when they want to fish, thus ending derby
fishing, reducing bycatch, improving safety at sea, maximizing their profits (by
fishing when market prices are highest) and minimizing the overall cost of fishing
(National Research Council, 1999; Dolsak and Ostrom, 2003; McGarvey, 2003).
Individual fishing quota programs affect not only the biological and social
aspects of commercial fisheries, but there are a number of ecological aspects of
these programs as well. To properly determine how IFQ programs affect the
ecology of a fishery, scientists analyze mortality (Branch, 2009). There are a
number of causes of fishing mortality within marine fisheries outside natural
mortality. One of the most significant causes is harvesting. Perhaps less known
causes include ghost fishing (continued inadvertent fishing by gear lost at sea),
discards (fish thrown back into the water), and illegal/unreported catches. Ghost
fishing is a particular problem in derby-style fishing in which fishers carelessly
deploy as much gear as possible in order to catch large numbers of fish in a
short time (Branch, 2009). Sometimes that gear, such as traps, can be left out at
sea in the haste of derby fishing. IFQ programs can provide fishers the
incentives needed to use better fishing practices (Dolsak and Ostrom, 2003). In
the Alaskan halibut fishery, for example, ghost fishing from abandoned gear was
a startling 554 tonnes in 1994 but only one year later, that figure was reduced to
126 tonnes as a result of an IFQ program. Similarly, IFQ programs in the
sablefish and halibut fisheries of British Columbia decreased ghost fishing and
mortality by half (Branch, 2009).
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IFQ programs may benefit others who are not direct beneficiaries, such as
fish dealers, processors, and the general public. In open access systems, fishers
often flood markets with selected species of fish but when a fishery is shut down
for the remainder of the year, markets quickly run out of those species.
Economists have pointed out that the consumer benefits from low prices during
flooded markets; but they suffer when fish become scarce. IFQ programs allow
markets to maintain a steady supply throughout the year (Squires et al, 1998;
National Research Council, 1999). Those fish will also be of a higher quality
since fishers can be more selective in their fishing methods (National Research
Council, 1999).
Another benefit of access control is the shift in philosophies and practices
of fishers (Anderson, 1995). Since IFQ programs give fishers permission to
harvest a certain amount of fish year after year, they will be more likely to
consider the health and sustainability of the fish stocks. As long as stocks are
maintained at sustainable levels, the TAC remains unchanged, and a fisher’s
allocation remains unchanged as well. The TAC may even increase due to an
improvement of fish stocks, resulting in a proportionate increase in a fisher’s
allocation. Otherwise, overharvesting will result in a decrease in TAC, leading to
a similar reduction in IFQ access rights. Fishers recognize the benefits of
protecting the stocks to ensure they will continue to have access to the fishery.
Fishers also have financial incentives to maintain the long term sustainability and
health of fish stocks because this increases the value of their transferable
permits. These incentives often lead fishers to support conservative regulations
11

as well as developing better fishing practices (McGarvey, 2003; Dolsak and
Ostrom, 2003).
Pairing IFQ management with other forms of management will also
enhance the benefits of quota systems. For example, Stefansson and
Rosenberg (2005) suggest combining IFQs with marine protected areas (MPAs)
– areas of the ocean in which no fishing activities can occur. They argue that
many marine fishery problems are so severe that a single management system is
not enough to protect stocks, and by adding MPAs to the management scheme,
the risk of stock collapse can be significantly reduced. Increased productivity of
a stock can also be attributed to the use of MPAs in conjunction with IFQs
because the population is able to increase within the preserve and thus replenish
stocks outside the preserve at a faster rate (Stefansson and Rosenberg, 2005).
The number of recreational fishers has expanded due to increases in
disposable income and leisure time, further increasing the demand for fish
(Kearney, 2001). Since there is only one ocean, both commercial and
recreational users share the same resource, often causing competition between
the two users. Conflict arises when recreational anglers believe that commercial
fishers are given an unfair portion of the TAC and, as a result, overexploit
fisheries (Kearney, 2001). If designed correctly, IFQ programs offer a potential
solution to the conflict between commercial and recreational fishers. In New
Zealand, both the commercial and recreational sectors are allocated shares of
the fishery. The shares for the recreational fishery are only loosely defined but
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they have historically been set at a level that the recreational users find sufficient
(Kearney, 2001).
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Drawbacks of IFQs

Individual fishing quota programs are not without flaws. For example,
problems can arise even before a program begins due to faulty record keeping.
Most access control programs are derived from historical landings in a fishery.
Managers allocate a fisher’s yearly allowable catch based on what they have
caught in the past. If records are incomplete or do not exist, fishers may receive
an unfair allocation. Inaccurate records may also lead authorities to set a quota
that does not accurately reflect the abundance of a stock (McGarvey, 2003).
Conflicts also arise with the initial allocation. Fishers who receive an allocation
when the program first begins have an advantage over those who do not. These
fishers get an allocation free of charge but the fishers who do not get an
allocation at the beginning of the program have to spend money in order to enter
a fishery (Dolsak and Ostrom, 2003).
Once the programs are implemented, however, there are other problems.
According to McCay (1995), IFQ participants have an incentive to under-report
their catches as a way to increase the total amount of fish they can harvest each
year. This makes sufficient enforcement and monitoring essential to the success
of the program, but this, in turn, increases program costs. In addition, some
opponents argue that IFQ programs do not cause fishers to improve their fishing
practices as proponents believe. They claim that fishers have an increased
incentive to develop more destructive practices, such as increased discards and
highgrading (throwing back dead fish in order to leave their quota available for
larger, more profitable fish) (McGarvey, 2003). Opponents also argue that, as a
14

way to cope with increased restrictions on one species of fish, fishers may shift
their efforts to other species (Squires et al, 1998; Branch, 2009). This is
problematic for the other species, which may become more vulnerable to
overfishing and collapse.

15

Social Impacts

The most significant problems with this type of management are those
associated with the social characteristics of fisheries. Commercial fishing is like
any other career in that rule changes can greatly affect the people who derive a
living from marine resources. The most prevalent problem associated with IFQ
programs is the loss of jobs (due to fewer fishing trips or leaving the fishery
altogether) and subsequent impacts on fishing communities. Job loss in any
industry is never a good thing but in small communities, where oftentimes fishers
rely solely on their catch, losing one’s job can be devastating. With more and
more fishing businesses limiting their participation in a fishery, more and more
crew members are seeing a reduction in available jobs (Branch and Hilborn,
2008; Dolsak and Ostrom, 2003). Job losses can lead to changes in community
structure, causing shifts in both the culture and society as a whole, particularly
when small, family owned companies sell out to large corporate firms (McCay,
1995). Branch and Hilborn (2008), however, argue that a reduction in jobs may
not necessarily be a bad thing. Even if overall employment is reduced, the
average income may actually increase and become more stable among the
fishers that remain employed (Branch, 2009).
Opponents of IFQ programs emphasize the enormous implications of
inequitable access on small fishing operations and communities. A fishery that
was historically harvested by anyone who had the ability to do so would now be
accessible only to a select few (Stewart et al, 2006). Indeed, some fear that the
fishing industry may become concentrated in the hands of a few large
16

companies, potentially devastating local fishing communities (Stewart et al, 2006;
Dolsak and Ostrom, 2003; National Research Council, 1999).
Consolidation of IFQ shares has a variety of widespread implications.
First, as the IFQ shares become concentrated in fewer and fewer hands, the size
of the market for those shares decreases dramatically. This means that it gets
increasingly difficult for participants to find and buy more shares. This also
makes it more difficult for new, young fishers to enter the fishery because the
cost of entry becomes higher as ownership gets consolidated (McCay, 2008;
Branch and Hilborn, 2008). Furthermore, entire communities can be harmed by
increasing consolidation and other aspects of privatization. In particular, smaller
communities lose a large part of their heritage and income when outside fishers
gain holdings in the fishery that was once readily available to all residents
(Branch and Hilborn, 2008). As a way to avoid this, however, managers can opt
to implement ownership caps to prevent participants from gaining an excessive
amount of IFQ shares (National Marine Fisheries Service, 2007).
One of the most difficult impacts of IFQ programs on fishing communities
is the change in how people view fishing and the fish they catch. Sometimes the
notion of private property rights takes the passion and interest out of the industry.
Instead of viewing fish as a resource to be shared, they are seen simply as a
tradable commodity, which they need to barter in order to make money. In the
British Columbia salmon fishery IFQ, for instance, participants have increasingly
come to see fish in terms of their tradable property value rather than the value
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they provide once they are harvested. These “paper fish” have become
hypothetical properties that are owned instead of harvested (Butler, 2008).
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Fishers’ Perceptions of IFQs

The perspective of stakeholders is a large factor in the development and
success of IFQ programs. Without the support of fishers, fishery managers, and
other stakeholders such as seafood dealers and environmental groups, there
would not be a foundation on which to develop a successful IFQ program.
Meanwhile, opponents of the programs ensure that IFQ programs are
implemented in a fair and equitable fashion by voicing their concerns and
standing up for what they believe should be done if IFQ programs are inevitable.
In 1987 (one year after the implementation of the IFQ system in New Zealand),
Dewees (1989) interviewed 62 commercial fishers and fishing company
managers. He collected data on the characteristics of the industry as well as
their perceptions of, adaptations to, and problems with New Zealand’s IFQ
program. Dewees (1989) found that such programs have a higher probability of
success among stakeholders, especially fishers, if they appear to be simple,
beneficial, and similar to their beliefs and current practices. New Zealand fishers
believed that the IFQ implemented in their region was easy to follow. In fact, they
saw a number of benefits, including reduced competition, conservation of fish
stocks, and increased retirement security. Twenty-three percent of the
interviewees identified the reduction of fishing effort as an advantage of the IFQ
program and 53% acknowledged conservation as an added benefit (Dewees,
1989).
Of course, not all aspects of the IFQ program in New Zealand went over
well with fishers. Most of the fishers interviewed expressed concern over the
19

need to change their fishing practices and the possible difficulty for new
participants entering the fishery due to high costs associated with buying IFQ
shares. About 66% of the study participants believed discards (both bycatch and
highgrading) would greatly increase mortality. Fishers also feared the problems
associated with enforcement, including ending illegal fishing, harsh prosecution
for insignificant violations, and even a lack of enforcement (Dewees, 1989).
Under-reporting was also a concern for fishers. Of those interviewed, 41%
believed that under reporting would decrease because of possible severe
punishment while 35% thought under-reporting would increase due to higher
prices, the motivation to cheat, low quotas, and low numbers of available fish.
Consolidation and reduction in allowed catch were also mentioned as potential
problems by about a quarter of study participants. Overall, however, the majority
(58%) of fishers contended that the IFQ system was better than previous
management measures (Dewees, 1989). Regardless of fishers’ perspectives on
the program, the general sentiment among fishers was that previous attempts to
manage fisheries were not working and something had to be done.
Dewees (1998, 2008) performed additional surveys in 1995 and 2005.
During each interview, Dewees used the same questions as in his 1987 study,
ranging from general happiness with the program to economic inquiries.
Responses to some questions varied over the 18-year period, but some general
trends stand out. Among the trends he discovered were consistent concerns
over the difficulty of new participants entering the fishery due to high prices of
IFQ shares. He also found that a majority of fishers agreed that the IFQ system
20

helps conserve fish stocks and that fisheries within New Zealand are better off
under the IFQ program (Dewees, 2008). When fishers were asked open-ended
questions to categorize both the IFQ system’s benefits and drawbacks, the
results demonstrate clear shifts in answers to some questions through time while
on other issues, answers reveal no clear trend (Table 1). For example, the
percentage of participants who believed IFQs provide a secure asset declined
from 42% in 1987 to 26% in 2005. Similarly, those who thought fishing effort was
reduced also decreased from 1987 to 2005, 23% to 0% respectively (Dewees,
2008). The percentage of participants who thought high grading and discards
were a problem declined from 66% in 1987 to 19% in 2005.
Table 1: Changes in responses of New Zealand fishers to surveys regarding the
IFQ System

Positive Effects
Provides security/asset
Reduces effort
Conserves fish stocks
Improved quality/value
added

% responses in
1987 (N=62)

% responses in
1995 (N=52)

% responses in
2005 (N=31)

42
23
53

27
13
50

26
0
71

0

19

10

66
40
26

25
21
46

19
45
23

6

33

19

0
0
0

35
0
0

42
23
19

0

0

10

Problems
High grading/discarding
Enforcement issues
Excessive company control
Resource allocation
conflicts/rights erosion
Complexity
Cost recovery fees
Ministry of Fisheries listening
Loss of local fishing
communities/infrastructure

(Dewees, 2008)
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Environmental Group Perceptions of IFQs

Environmental groups are also very important to fisheries management.
They greatly influence the public’s opinion as well as lobby the government on a
variety of issues. Oftentimes various environmental groups have a wide range of
opinions and IFQ programs are no exception. Some environmental groups
strongly oppose IFQ programs, others express equally strong support, while still
others lie somewhere in the middle. Regardless of their stance on the issue, the
majority of U.S. environmental groups agree that the nation’s fisheries are facing
a major crisis – fishing capacity is too large for the number of fish that are
available. This crisis is perpetuating the race for the fish and causing fish stocks
to decline to unsustainable levels (Anderson, 1995).
One environmental group that expresses strong resistance to IFQ
programs is Greenpeace (Anderson, 1995). While they admit that open access
fishing ultimately harms the resource, they argue that IFQ programs are not the
only possible solution. Greenpeace is deeply opposed to granting private
property rights to publicly owned resources, contending that IFQs are profit
driven rather than oriented toward conservation. Members contend that
overfishing stems only partly from open access fisheries, and that “global
industrialization” is also to blame (Anderson, 1995). Greenpeace accuses
industrialized fisheries of causing overcapitalization because they use improved
technologies for both harvesting and processing, as well as new marketing
strategies to create a global market. Another fear of Greenpeace and others is
the threat of monopolization of fisheries by large corporations, leading to the
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demise of smaller scale operations, job losses, and lower wages (Anderson,
1995).
On the other side of the spectrum are environmental organizations that
provide strong endorsements for government sponsored IFQs. The
Environmental Defense Fund, for example, is an active supporter of fishery
access controls, especially IFQs (Anderson, 1995). They argue that IFQs are a
better solution to overcapitalization because other programs do not modify the
race for the fish. The current system of licenses promote equality, which often
leads to an excess of fishers being granted permission to harvest more fish than
stocks can support (Anderson, 1995). Moreover, the Environmental Defense
Fund argues that IFQs are based on incentives for conservation such as
reducing ghost fishing and ending the race for the fish, thus reducing the
potential for the quota to be exceeded (Anderson, 1995). Quotas are less likely
to be exceeded under an IFQ program because real-time data obtained in IFQ
programs eliminates the lag time in which data is reported to fishery managers –
a problem that plagues other management methods. Limited access programs,
such as IFQs, will also likely reduce discard mortality because fishers have more
time to properly handle and release discarded individuals.
Yet even the strongest supporters of IFQs such as the Environmental
Defense Fund offer some advice to fishery managers: if IFQs are to be
implemented, caution must be used in choosing which fisheries are to be
managed through such programs and these programs must be designed
carefully. Indeed, there are a number of potential problems such as inadequate
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enforcement, cheating, under-reporting, mis-reporting, and highgrading
(Anderson, 1995). Still, they argue that all management methods have their
share of problems and drawbacks to IFQs can be resolved through careful
design of the program. The Environmental Defense Fund disagrees with
Greenpeace in the debate over consolidation. They believe IFQs provide small
operations with flexibility to adapt to the programs, and if people are concerned
about consolidation, the government can institute ownership caps (Anderson,
1995). Such caps can prevent large companies from dominating a fishery.
A number of environmental groups take a moderate stance on IFQs. The
Center for Marine Conservation (CMC) and World Wildlife Fund (WWF) are two
examples. Like the Environmental Defense Fund, the CMC suggests other
causes for overfishing: complex regulations, inadequate enforcement, and
unclear management responsibilities among various fishery managers
(Anderson, 1995). Moreover, they stress that not all problems are a result of
open access fishing and they warn fishery managers to avoid this assumption.
While they agree that there is a need for better fisheries management, neither
the CMC nor WWF actively supports or opposes IFQ programs. They do,
however, emphasize the need for caution and cooperation within the industry
during the development of IFQs (Anderson, 1995). The CMC and WWF support
conserving the natural resource and they contend that every fishery is unique –
and this must be taken into account by authorities. These organizations argue
that every limited access program results in a distinct, complex outcome and no
one program can be universally applied to all fisheries (Anderson, 1995).
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IFQ Management Case Studies

Numerous countries around the world have used IFQ programs in fishery
management since the late 1970s (National Research Council, 1999). Indeed,
the Prairie Lakes fisheries of Canada have had a thriving individual quota
program since the 1930s (Copes, 1986). More recent examples include New
Zealand, Iceland, Alaska, and western Canada’s province of British Columbia.
New Zealand implemented individual quotas for most of its fisheries in 1986 as a
response to the TAC being surpassed for many years (Stewart et al, 2006;
Sanchirico et al, 2006). The implemented IFQ program established allocations
for 17 inshore species as well as 9 offshore species (Sanchirico et al, 2006).
As with other IFQs, the goals of New Zealand’s program were to maximize
both economic benefits to those in the industry and conservation. Overall, the
consensus within the larger fishing companies was positive. They agreed that
quotas enabled them to “do long term planning and value-added product
development” (Dewees, 1998). Smaller-scale fishers, however, had mixed views
since larger companies received 82% of the quota (Dewees, 1998).
Consolidation is a prevailing problem within the New Zealand IFQ system, which,
in turn, leads to an increase in allocation leasing. IFQ participants are able to
lease their allocation to other participants for a single fishing year. This allows
fishers with small shares to buy more and fish longer throughout the year. In
New Zealand, the total number of quota holders fell from 1,300 in 1986 to 1,100
in 2000 (a decline of 15%), while the number of leases increased 10 fold (1,500
to 15,000) during that same time frame (Stewart et al, 2006). One of the large
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quota holders in New Zealand is the native population (known as the Maori), who
filed a claim to the fishery resources with the government. As part of the
settlement, this group was given ownership of over 40% of the total quota for
each species managed under the IFQ in1992 and are allocated 20% of the quota
for all IFQ programs implemented after 1992 (Sanchirico et al, 2006).
Overall, New Zealand witnessed some positive outcomes from
implementing IFQ programs. According to Leal (2002), fishers now have time to
properly target larger fish, leading to a higher quality of product. They were also
able to bring live fish to the market because they started using Styrofoam
containers paired with a water supply (Leal, 2002). After 10 years of operating
under IFQ programs, fish stocks in New Zealand have rebounded to more
encouraging levels. In 2002, authorities estimated that 80% of fish stocks off
New Zealand were above sustainable levels (Branch, 2009).
Iceland is another country credited with implementing an extensive quota
system. Iceland has long been very dependent on fishery resources and any
fluctuations in catches have profound impacts on living standards (Eythorsson,
2000). Iceland’s fishing industry is a major contributor (estimated 45%) to the
nation’s gross domestic product through trade and employment. In fact, in many
small, remote communities throughout Iceland, fishing is the largest employer
(Sanchirico et al, 2006). A total of 36 out of 61 fishing harbors throughout the
island nation are in areas with no more than 1,000 residents (Dolsak and Ostrom,
2003). Of particular importance is the demersal or groundfish fishery (composed
of cod, haddock, saith, redfish, and Greenland halibut), which generates over
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80% of the total economic value of Iceland’s fishery resources (Eythorsson,
2000; Dolsak and Ostrom, 2003). As a result of grim predictions for the cod
stock, the Icelandic Parliament passed a Fisheries Management Act in 1983,
implementing vessel quotas (Eythorsson, 2000). Today, a total of 25 species are
managed under the quota system and collectively, they account for more than
97% of the commercial value of Iceland’s fish harvest (Sanchirico et al, 2006).
As with any management measure, the IFQ program in Iceland has
encountered some problems. The intention of the IFQ system was to reduce the
number of vessels utilizing the fishery, but the number of vessels actually
increased – despite the government’s attempt at a buy-back program (Karlsdottir,
2008). Also, unlike many of its counterparts, Iceland’s IFQ shares were not
initially transferable. While they could be leased, they could only be sold along
with the original vessel. If the shares were transferred from the vessel that was
originally allocated the quota, that original vessel had to permanently leave the
fishery (Karlsdottir, 2008; Eythorsson, 2000).
Many changes brought about drastic improvements for Iceland’s IFQ
system. The Fisheries Management Act (1990) made IFQ systems that had
existed since the 1980s a permanent fixture in fisheries management (Sanchirico
et al, 2006; Karlsdottir, 2008). IFQs were also extended to incorporate several
new species as well as allocating shares to about 900 smaller vessels
(Karlsdottir, 2008). Other changes included a shift of focus from conservation to
efficiency.
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Perhaps the most profound change in Iceland’s IFQ occurred in 1990
when shares became fully divisible and independently transferable, which made
them more like private property rights (Karlsdottir, 2008). Fishery managers
reasoned that transferability would make the program more flexible and provide a
more efficient use of capital. These changes, however, brought about some
unforeseen problems. For example, consolidation became a serious issue. In
1990, the ten largest fishing companies were authorized to extract 21.9% of the
TAC but by 2001, they controlled 48.1% (Dolsak and Ostrom, 2003). The
distribution of quotas has shifted from owners residing in 79 different
municipalities in 1999 to just 45 municipalities in 2008 (Karlsdottir, 2008).
Despite significant consolidation, the overall success of the IFQ system in
Iceland can be seen in the recovery of fish stocks. Before the IFQs were
implemented, many species were the focus of heavy exploitation. After the IFQs
began, fish stocks did not immediately rebound but they stopped declining
(Branch, 2009). The reason IFQs are still in place today is twofold. First,
decisions made by those designing the program in the early stages made it too
difficult and expensive for fishery managers to overturn the programs. Second,
opposition to the system has not been consistent, leading to disagreement on the
potential alternatives to fisheries management (Dolsak and Ostrom, 2003).
The Province of British Columbia (in western Canada) implemented
individual vessel quotas in their Pacific halibut fishery in 1991, after a limited
entry program enacted in 1979 resulted in a fishing derby. In 1982, the halibut
season lasted 60 days but was reduced to just six days in 1990 (despite a larger
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TAC); and then it was increased to eight months under an IFQ system (Dewees,
1998; Butler, 2008; Leal, 2002). The TAC was divided among the 435 licensed
vessels and dockside monitoring ensured landings were validated (Butler, 2008).
The equal price per pound (regardless of fish size) gives the halibut IFQ program
an advantage because it avoids problems common in other IFQ programs. For
example, in other programs, smaller fish are sold at a lower price per pound than
larger fish. This provides fishers an incentive to highgrade (throw back smaller
fish which end up dying) in hopes of increasing their profits. In the halibut IFQ
program, fishers have lower incentives to highgrade because fish of varying sizes
are sold at the same or similar price per pound. Highgrading is a problem
because it results in more discards, thus increasing fishing mortality. Selling
halibut at similar prices under the IFQ program helps prevent unnecessary
mortality in the halibut stocks (Pinkerton and Edwards, 2009).
The outcomes of the British Columbia halibut IFQ program are clear.
Processors now have access to, and can sell larger quantities of, fresh fish
throughout much of the year. Before IFQ implementation, only 42% of their fish
were sold fresh but that figure increased to 94% after implementation of IFQs
(Dewees, 1998; Leal, 2002). Other benefits stemming from the IFQ program in
the British Columbia halibut fishery include a safer industry due to the slower
pace of work; the costs of managing the IFQ program are paid for by participants
rather than taxpayers; and the value of halibut licenses has doubled (Butler,
2008). However, the increased value of the license also makes it more difficult
for new fishers to enter the fishery because they must spend more money simply
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to buy a license, and oftentimes finances are the limiting factor in getting started
in the industry.
The halibut fishery in neighboring Alaska was also subject to total
allowable catch regulations. Initially, the Pacific halibut fishery in Alaska was
harvested by European immigrants beginning around 1910 (Landgon, 2008). An
increase in technological developments (thus making harvest easier) paired with
a limited entry requirement for salmon in Alaska contributed to increasing
pressure on the halibut fishery. This increase in pressure resulted in a dramatic
decline in season length from 120 days to two days by the early 1980s (Landgon,
2008; National Research Council, 1999). In response to the shortened seasons,
fishers tended to increase both the number and size of their vessels in addition to
investing in newer, more efficient gear (National Research Council, 1999).
Alaska’s IFQ program was eventually implemented in 1995 by the National
Marine Fisheries Service-Alaska Region for the Pacific halibut fishery in an
attempt to stop derby fishing (Leal, 2002; Langdon, 2008). One major force
towards the creation of Alaska’s IFQ program was the perceived benefits fishery
managers witnessed in the halibut fishery in British Columbia – particularly the
increase in price per pound (Leal, 2002).
Like their Canadian counterparts and others throughout the world, the
Alaskan IFQ system produced numerous benefits. The season length increased
to an average of 245 days which lead to an increase in the availability of fresh
fish throughout the year (Leal, 2002; National Research Council, 1999). Also, as
fishing became more regulated to comply with the IFQ program, this improved
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safety at sea, reduced ghost fishing, and eliminated the race for the fish (National
Research Council, 1999). The most impressive improvement of the Alaskan
halibut fishery is seen in the value of landings. In 1995, the total landings were
worth just over $295 million whereas in 1998, the value of landings increased to
almost $492 million, despite no drastic increase in overall quota (Leal, 2002).
In a paper published in 1996, Grafton evaluates existing IFQ programs
throughout the world. The paper analyzes whether or not there was a reduction
in fishing effort or an increase in profitability. One of the most publicized goals of
IFQ programs is the reduction in the number of vessels targeting a particular
species. Grafton (1996) argues that in most Canadian IFQ programs, the
number of vessels actively fishing declined with the implementation of IFQ
programs. One year after the British Columbia sablefish IFQ program was
enacted, the number of vessels was reduced from 46 to 30. A more significant
reduction was seen in Australia’s bluefin tuna fishery where the number of quota
holders declined from 143 to 63 in the first four years of IFQs (Grafton, 1996).
Grafton (1996) also evaluated the increased profitability within IFQ managed
fisheries. Profitability may increase as a result of various sources, including
reduced competition and better quality of fish. In the British Columbia sablefish
fishery, the value of sablefish licenses increased 400% and the season was
significantly lengthened, helping fishers get a higher return for their fish (Grafton,
1996).
The United States Department of Commerce has also implemented IFQ
programs for the Alaskan sablefish, wreckfish, and surf clams/quahog fisheries,
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and it was ready to enact programs for two more fisheries when Congress
passed the Sustainable Fisheries Act (SFA) of 1996 (National Research Council,
1999). The SFA established a moratorium on new IFQ programs until scientists
performed more research on their effectiveness. Congress also asked the
National Academy of Sciences to study several components of IFQ programs,
including the social, economic, and biological effects of IFQs and other limited
entry management methods. The National Academy of Sciences was asked to
make recommendations for both future and existing IFQ programs. The National
Research Council published their results in a 1999 book entitled Sharing the
Fish: Toward a National Policy on Individual Fishing Quotas. In this volume, the
National Research Council recommended that Congress lift the ban on IFQs and
return authority to the regional councils to design and manage IFQ programs at
their discretion.
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IFQ Programs in the Gulf of Mexico

Marine resources within the federal exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of the
Gulf of Mexico are managed by the Gulf of Mexico Fishery Management Council
(Gulf Council). The EEZ consists of waters in the Gulf of Mexico from the
seaward side of state waters out to 200 nautical miles (nm). In the Gulf of
Mexico, state water boundaries vary depending on the state. For instance,
Florida and Texas state waters extend from the coastline to nine nautical miles.
For the rest of the Gulf states (Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana), state water
boundaries extend only to three nautical miles (Figure 1). The Gulf Council is
composed of 17 voting members: the National Marine Fisheries Service
Southeast region Regional Administrator, directors of each Gulf state’s marine
resource management agencies, and 11 members appointed by the U.S.
Secretary of Commerce (Gulf of Mexico Fishery Management Council, 2009).
These 11 appointed members are made up of various industry participants,
including commercial and recreational fishers.
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Figure 1: Map of the Gulf of Mexico exclusive economic zone (EEZ)
(Courtesy of the National Marine Fisheries Service)

Before 2007, the Gulf of Mexico red snapper fishery faced a number of
serious problems, including overcapacity and overcapitalization (NMFS, 2009a).
Overcapacity is defined as the difference between harvesting capacity and a
management target catch, given the stock conditions associated with that target
catch (Terry and Kirkley, 2006). According to the Gulf Council, overcapitalization
occurs when the collective harvest capacity of both vessels and participants in
the fishery are in excess of the level required to efficiently harvest the
commercial share of the TAC (Gulf of Mexico Fishery Management Council,
2008). Both overcapacity and overcapitalization place strain on the biological
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(species population) and social/economic (market value and profit) components
of the fishery. This strain on the fishery poses a threat to the overall health and
sustainability of an important public resource. These conditions resulted in a
shortening of the commercial red snapper season from the potential year-long
season to an average of 88 days from 1992 to 2006. Regulations were originally
designed to lengthen the fishing season by implementing trip limits and seasonal
closures during which red snapper could not be harvested. These regulations,
however, had little success in ending the race for red snapper. As a result, the
National Marine Fisheries Service implemented an IFQ program for the red
snapper commercial fishery beginning January 1, 2007.
The Gulf Council is now facing similar problems in the grouper and tilefish
fisheries. Current management of these fisheries is based on a “traditional
command and control approach” which includes permits, quotas, trip limits,
minimum size limits, gear restrictions, and seasonal closures (Gulf of Mexico
Fishery Management Council, 2008). The National Marine Fisheries Service
claims that both the grouper and tilefish fisheries have been overcapitalized,
meaning harvest capacity of vessels in the grouper and tilefish fisheries exceeds
the sustainable yield. As a result, regulations have become more and more
restrictive, which perpetuates the race for fish. This race causes the fishery to be
closed early in the fishing year (January through December) since the TAC is
often met so quickly. In recent years, the “Deepwater Grouper” fishery closed
five to seven months early each year; the “Shallow Water Grouper” fishery closed
six to ten weeks before the end of the fishing year in both 2004 and 2005; and
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harvest of tilefish is usually prohibited four to six months early each year (Gulf of
Mexico Fishery Management Council, 2008). The Gulf Council anticipated that
maintaining the current regulations would only promote the continuation of derby
fishing, increased operating costs, increasingly shorter fishing seasons,
decreased safety at sea, reduced profits for fishers, and unstable markets for
fresh fish (Gulf of Mexico Fishery Management Council, 2008).
As a way to address the increasing restrictions, the Gulf Council
developed Amendment 29 to the Reef Fish Fishery Management Plan (FMP),
which outlines possible ways to reduce fishing effort and overcapacity in both the
grouper and tilefish commercial fisheries (Gulf of Mexico Fishery Management
Council, 2008). By reducing the fishing effort, the Gulf Council hopes that some
of the major problems (overcapacity, derby fishing, shorter fishing seasons, and
so forth) faced by the grouper and tilefish fisheries are mitigated or at the very
least, they hope to prevent the problems from getting any worse. The
amendment set out two alternatives – permit endorsements or an IFQ program.
After a number of deliberations and public comment periods, the Gulf Council
determined that the most effective way to manage fishing effort and overcapacity
in the grouper and tilefish fisheries was to implement an IFQ program. On
August 31, 2009, the National Marine Fisheries Service published a final rule in
the Federal Register, implementing an IFQ program, beginning January 1, 2010.
Within the grouper and tilefish IFQ program, commercial fishers are given
shares and allocation. IFQ shares are a certain percentage of the commercial
portion of the TAC for that fishing year. On the other hand, a shareholder’s
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allocation, a specified number of pounds that shareholder is permitted to harvest,
is based on the percentage of the shares. For instance, if a shareholder has 2.1
shares of gag grouper (with a TAC of 1.41 million pounds), they would be
allowed to harvest 2.1% of the TAC (29,610 pounds of gag grouper) for that
fishing year (NMFS, 2010).
A commercial fisher’s shares and allocation in the Gulf of Mexico grouper
and tilefish IFQ are based on the amount of fish they landed from 1999 through
2004. The Ad Hoc Grouper IFQ Advisory Panel, which is made up of commercial
fishermen and dealers who are active in the fisheries, provided guidance to the
Gulf Council indicating that using landings data from 1999 to 2004 is a “fair,
equitable, and accurate representation of who has investments and dependence
upon the fishery (both current and historical)” (Gulf of Mexico Fishery
Management Council, 2008, 52). On November 16, 2004, the National Marine
Fisheries Service published an advanced notice of proposed rulemaking in which
they announced a control date of October 15, 2004 (NMFS, 2004). The advance
notice of proposed rulemaking was intended to inform the public that the Gulf
Council was considering establishing an IFQ program in the grouper and tilefish
fisheries. The control date set out by the notice was designed to discourage
fishers from increasing their efforts in the grouper and tilefish fisheries to
increase their landings history. As a result of the control date, the Gulf Council
would establish IFQ eligibility criteria based on landings prior to October 15,
2004.
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Under previous management methods prior to the IFQ program, landings
were reported by dealers twice per month to the National Marine Fisheries
Service’s Science Center through the Quota Monitoring System. Under this
program, dealers were required to report the amount of each fish they bought for
each time period. Based on reports received by dealers, the National Marine
Fisheries Service monitored landings for each species. Once the reports
indicated landings for any particular species were nearing the TAC for that fishing
year, the Science Center estimated when the TAC would be met for that species.
Based on these estimates, the National Marine Fisheries Service would close
that fishery, thus prohibiting any more harvest for the remainder of the fishing
year. This method leaves a lot of room for error and opens up the possibility the
TAC can be exceeded. The lag in time between when fish are landed, when the
dealer sends the reports through the mail or electronically, and when the Science
Center inputs the data means fish can be legally caught even after the TAC is
reached.
Under the IFQ program, landings data is reported in real-time, meaning
there is no lag in reporting from the time fish have been landed to when they are
recorded by the National Marine Fisheries Service. The IFQ program utilizes an
online reporting system in which dealers input the amount of fish landed, and this
is immediately deducted from the commercial fisher’s IFQ account. The real-time
data paired with the set quota for each fisher dramatically decreases the
possibility of quotas being exceeded.
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In both management methods, however, a serious concern lies with the
accuracy of landings data. Previous methods allowed dealers to report their
landings on a piece of paper and mail it in at a later time. It was almost
impossible to ensure that reports accurately reflected landings. The Science
Center just had to take the word of dealers. Under the IFQ program, similar
concerns abound. However, random dockside monitoring by both state and
federal law enforcement agents helps ensure that more reliable data is
transmitted to authorities. The online system also requires input from both
fishers and dealers. The dealer inputs the data into the online system and the
fisher must confirm by typing their unique personal identification number. This
confirmation process makes it harder for one participant to cheat the system
without the help of another participant.
The impact of IFQ programs on both stocks and fishing communities are
varied. Yet, it is how these programs are viewed that determines how well they
accomplish intended goals. How stakeholders perceive the program determines
whether or not the new regulations are complied with. If commercial fishers and
dealers do not embrace the new rules, the IFQ will not be effective in
accomplishing the potential benefits. For this reason, it is of particular
importance that fishery managers understand the viewpoints of stakeholders and
what they think about the grouper and tilefish IFQ program.
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Objectives
The objective of this study is to determine stakeholders’ perspectives of
implementing an individual fishing quota (IFQ) program in the Gulf of Mexico
grouper and tilefish commercial fisheries. Scientists have completed many
studies on the effectiveness of IFQ programs on biological characteristics of
fisheries but very few studies have been conducted on the social aspects
(opinions) of all involved stakeholders. Social components of public policies are
crucial to properly understanding the success and failures of regulations. Fishery
managers can then use that knowledge to better develop and implement more
appropriate regulations.
Public policies can only be sustained if those involved both understand
and support such policies. Managing commercial fisheries, especially IFQ
programs, relies heavily on stakeholder support to ensure success. Without
support, an IFQ program will not meet its goals. For instance, if fishers do not
accept the IFQ program, they may be less inclined to comply with the new rules,
despite the threat of punishment.
The Gulf Council is implementing an IFQ program in the Gulf of Mexico
grouper and tilefish fisheries through Amendment 29 to the Reef Fish Fishery
Management Plan. This study analyzes the opinions and perspectives of permit
holders, dealers, state/federal agencies, academics, and non-governmental
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organizations (NGOs). The intent of the study is to gain a better understanding
of how stakeholders view implementation of the new IFQ program and its
effectiveness. Research questions include:
How do perceptions differ among stakeholders?
Between those who are large or small operations?
Between those who use different gear types?
Between various roles within the fishery (i.e. captain and permit
owner)
Between various affiliations with the fishery (i.e. permit holders,
dealers, state/federal agencies, academia, and NGOs)?
What do stakeholders anticipate the IFQ program will accomplish (i.e.
increased profits, increased safety at sea, decreased bycatch)?
What kind of problems do stakeholders foresee from the program?
Do stakeholders anticipate the online system requirement will create
undue hardships (i.e. lack of Internet access and/or computer knowledge
causing hardships)?
Do stakeholders anticipate better or worse enforcement under the IFQ
program as compared to previous management measures?
Do stakeholders perceive the IFQ program as an effective means to
protect stocks?
Do stakeholders perceive the IFQ program as an effective means to
reduce overcapitalization and/or reduce effort?
Do stakeholders perceive the IFQ as an improvement over current
management actions? In what ways?
I expect research to show that a stakeholder’s involvement with the
grouper and tilefish IFQ program will play a large role in determining their opinion
of the program. Answers to questions regarding effectiveness, outcomes,
possible benefits, and potential problems will likely be different among
stakeholders based on their connection and involvement in the program. I
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expect permit holders to have a very different stance on the program than those
belonging to state or federal agencies or NGOs. I anticipate permit holders will
express a more negative approach to the program because many see it as a
violation of their rights while those in government agencies or NGOs will likely
see the IFQ program as essential to protect the Gulf of Mexico’s grouper and
tilefish populations. Similarly, I believe larger fishing operators will have a more
positive opinion of the IFQ program because they have higher historical landings,
and thus will have a higher initial allocation than those with smaller operations
and a smaller landings history.
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Methods

On January 1, 2010, the National Marine Fisheries Service implemented
an IFQ program for the grouper and tilefish commercial fisheries through
Amendment 29 to the Gulf of Mexico Reef Fish Fishery Management Plan. This
study analyzes stakeholder perspectives of the IFQ program to determine how
those opinions differ based on different groups’ involvement in the Gulf of Mexico
fisheries.
In order to complete research and data collection, a survey was developed
(Appendix A) asking questions regarding the subjects’ opinions on the grouper
and tilefish IFQ program. During the development process, a draft survey was
distributed to a number of constituents, including commercial fishers and fishery
managers, during a South Atlantic Fishery Management Council meeting.
Feedback provided by the constituents was integrated into the survey to help
improve the wording and types of questions asked. The survey was also
approved by the University of South Florida Institutional Review Board (IRB).
The IRB requires all research involving human subjects to be approved in order
to ensure the privacy and protection of the subjects.
The survey asked subjects to state their opinion of the program based on
a number of questions, including expected effects on both the grouper and
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tilefish fisheries and their personal operations. The majority of questions asked
respondents to rate their agreement on a number of statements such as “bycatch
will decline under the IFQ program” or “the IFQ program is an effective means to
protect fish stocks.” Participants were also given an opportunity to express any
concerns or comments. Surveys were distributed through the mail in November
2009, and included a self-addressed stamped envelope for participants to easily
return the survey. Surveys were collected through January 2010, providing three
months for respondents to return the completed documents.
The study focuses on stakeholders that have a relationship with the
grouper and tilefish IFQ program. Even before establishment of the IFQ
program, those involved in the commercial fishery (i.e. commercial fishers and
dealers) must own a permit in order to participate in the fishery (reef fish permit
or reef fish dealer permit). A list of all permit holders is public information and
was obtained from the National Marine Fisheries Service. The survey was
mailed to every commercial Gulf reef fish fisher (1,018 surveys) and every Gulf
reef fish dealer (180 surveys).
Relevant personnel from state/federal agencies include fishery managers
within the Gulf states as well as federal agencies. A total of 42 surveys were
distributed to fishery managers, including the fisheries division of each of the five
Gulf of Mexico states (Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, and Florida), as
well as representatives of federal agencies involved in fisheries management in
the Gulf of Mexico. These include the National Marine Fisheries Service, U.S.
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Coast Guard, Environmental Protection Agency, United States Geological
Survey, and the Gulf of Mexico Fishery Management Council.
Other groups surveyed were representatives of non-governmental
organizations (NGOs), including recreational fishermen associations, and those
in academia. NGOs were chosen based on the subject matter on which they
specialize. For instance, Food and Water Watch is particularly interested in
fisheries related issues. Organizations that have no connection to fisheries (such
as the Sierra Club), and thus would not be aware of the IFQ program, were not
surveyed. Seven recreational fisherman associations located within the Gulf of
Mexico were also selected to be surveyed as NGOs. A total of 21 surveys were
distributed to NGOs. Similarly, academics were identified based on their
particular area of study and expertise. A total of 85 surveys were sent to faculty
at 4-year public universities located in the states bordering the Gulf of Mexico.
Those involved in environmental science, marine resource management, and
fisheries in particular, were sent surveys.
Once the data was collected, answers were coded, allowing responses to
be quantified on a numeric scale (Appendix B). Questions 1, 6a, 6b, and 6c were
used to determine how respondents fit into four qualifying categories: affiliation
with the fishery (IFQ participants or non-IFQ participants), gear type (handline,
bandit, spear, or longline), role within the fishery (captain, permit/vessel owner, or
both captain and permit/vessel owner), and size of operation (small or large).
Responses to survey question 2 (familiarity with the grouper and tilefish IFQ
program) were coded on a scale of 1 to 5, with 1 representing “not at all familiar”
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and 5 representing “very familiar”. For survey questions 3, 4, 5, 7a, 8a, and 8b,
responses were coded on a scale of 1 to 2, with 1 indicating “Yes” and 2
indicating “No”. Survey questions 9 through 26 were coded on a scale of 1 to 5,
with 1 meaning “Strongly Agree” and 5 meaning “Strongly Disagree”. Additional
written comments from these questions were used as part of the discussion to
provide further evidence of respondents’ opinions. Survey questions 27 through
33 were also coded as outlined in appendix B and were applied to generate
demographic information using descriptive statistics.
After questions were coded, a number of statistical analyses were
conducted. For survey questions 3, 4, 5, 7a, 8a, and 8b, hypothesis testing for
two-sample proportions was performed using the statistical software SAS. The
hypothesis testing was used to determine if there is a statistically significant
difference in the proportion of respondents that answered “yes” in the different
groups. For the remainder of the questions (2 and 9-26), the Levene’s test for
equality of variances and a two-tailed two-sample t-test were conducted using
the statistical program SPSS. The t-test compared mean responses to various
survey questions dealing with each respondent’s perspective on the new grouper
and tilefish IFQ program to the four qualifying categories previously mentioned.
The outcome of the two-tailed two-sample t-test reveals whether or not the mean
responses of the two different groups of respondents (i.e. IFQ participants vs.
non-IFQ participants or large operations vs. small operations) per question have
a difference that is statistically significant. A statistical significance level of 0.05
(α = 0.05) was used for both statistical tests, meaning if a particular p-value from
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the t-test was less than or equal to 0.05 (p-value ≤ 0.05), the results (differences
of opinion on a given question) are statistically significant.
Once differences were determined to be statistically significant in the twotailed two-sample t-test, the direction of the difference in responses (i.e. what
each group said in relation to the other) was established based on the mean
responses for each question. For instance, when comparing responses of IFQ
participants with non-participants to the statement regarding whether or not more
fisheries should be managed with IFQs, the mean response of IFQ participants
was 4.00 while the mean responses for non-participants was 2.49. This indicates
that IFQ participants were more likely to disagree with the statement while nonparticipants were more inclined to agree. Similarly, if statistical differences were
found with hypothesis testing, the two proportions of yes for each group were
compared to determine which group had a higher proportion responding yes to a
specific question. Using this method, the differences in responses can be
discussed and provide insight into how these responses relate between groups.
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Results

From a total of 1,346 distributed surveys, 255 (18.95%) responses were
returned. However, approximately 123 permit holders own multiple permits,
therefore received multiple surveys. Of these 123 permit holders, 88 did not
return any surveys and 27 returned fewer surveys than they were given. Only 8
multiple permit holders returned all of the surveys, which accounted for only 24 of
the 255 total surveys returned.
Of the 255 responses, the majority (70.6%) were completed by
commercial fishers with only a small percentage belonging to other affiliations,
including dealers (9%), those who are both commercial fishers and dealers
(5.5%), fishery managers (7.1%), and academics (4.4%) (Figure 2). No surveys
from NGOs were returned (Table 2).
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4%

3%

Commercial Fishers

7%

Dealers

6%

Commercial Fishers and Dealers

9%

Fishery Managers
71%

Academia
Others
Figure 2: Composition of Survey Respondents
Table 2: Respondents to mail-in IFQ survey (Responses to survey question 1)
Number of
Affiliation
Percentage
Responses
Dealer
23
9.0
Commercial Fisher
162
63.5
Recreational Fisher
4
1.6
Government Agency
18
7.1
Environmental Group/NGO
0
0.0
Charterboat
0
0.0
Dealer and Commercial Fisher
10
3.9
Commercial and Recreational Fisher
12
4.7
Dealer, Commercial, and Recreational Fisher
2
0.8
Commercial Fisher and Charterboat
6
2.4
Dealer, Commercial Fisher, and Restaurant
1
0.4
Recreational Fisher and Charterboat
1
0.4
Vessel Owner/Seafood Market Owner
1
0.4
University Professor
3
1.2
Research Scientist
3
1.2
University Professor and Research Scientist
3
1.2
Recreational Fisher and Research Scientist
2
0.8
Previous Federal Employee
1
0.4
Unsure
1
0.4
Recreational Fisher and Fishing Rights Lobbyist
1
0.4
Missing Response
1
0.4
TOTAL
255
100.0
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Survey respondent demographics did not vary widely. Survey
respondents are predominately white (82.4%), male (90.9%), and have an
average age of 53 years old. About 78% of the responses came from Florida,
while other states accounted for only a small fraction of the returned surveys.
About 48% of respondents do not have college degrees while 17.3% have a
graduate degree. As for employment, 64.7% are self employed and 17.6% are
employed full-time.
Other than the questions posed to all respondents asking for general
opinions of the IFQ program overall, survey participants who considered
themselves commercial fishers were also asked a number of additional questions
regarding their professional practices, including gear type, their role in the
fishery, and the size of their operation (i.e. historical landings during the
qualifying years).
Fishers reported using 12 different types of gear (Table 3). In the grouper
and tilefish fisheries, both handline and rod and reel consist of a single vertical
line that is set and pulled by hand and attached to hooks. Bandit gear is very
similar, with rods and vertical lines attached to hooks, but instead of pulling the
line in by hand, it is retrieved by manual, electric, or hydraulic reels. Longline
gear is very different than other gear types because it is deployed horizontally
and contains numerous hooks. Once deployed, longlines are left in the water for
hours and then hauled back onto the vessel using manual, electric, or hydraulic
winches. Spear fishers use sharp, pointed, or barbed instruments on a long pole
with which they puncture targeted fish while SCUBA diving.
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Table 3: Responses to Question of Gear Types (survey question 6a)*
Number of
Responses
65
68
19
0
7
2
24
4
2
2
1
61
255

Gear Type
Handline/Rod & Reel
Bandit
Longline
Buoy Gear
Spear
Dive
Handline and Bandit
Handline and Spear
Bandit and Longline
Handline/Rod & Reel, Bandit, and Spear
Electric Reel
Missing Response
TOTAL

Percent
25.5
26.7
7.5
0.0
2.7
0.8
9.4
1.6
0.8
0.8
0.4
23.9
100.0

Valid
Percent
33.5
35.1
9.8
0.0
3.6
1.0
12.4
2.1
1.0
1.0
0.5
100.0

*The 61 missing responses correspond to the 61 respondents who are not commercial fishers,
and thus were not asked to specify a gear type.

Survey question 6b asks commercial fishers to specify their role in the
Gulf of Mexico grouper and tilefish fisheries, either as a boat captain or
permit/vessel owner. Only 194 of the 255 respondents identified themselves as
commercial fishers, therefore the remaining 61 survey respondents did not
answer this question. Of the commercial fishers that did respond to survey
question 6b, only 8.2% were boat captains, 39.2% were the owners of the permit
or vessel, and the remainder (52.5%) claimed to be both captain and
permit/vessel owner (Table 4).
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Table 4: Responses to Role within Fishery (survey question 6b)
Role
Captain
Permit/Vessel Owner
Both Captain and Permit/Vessel Owner
Captain, Permit/Vessel Owner, and Diver
Captain, Permit/Vessel Owner, and Crew
Captain, Permit/Vessel Owner, and Operator
Captain, Permit/Vessel Owner, and Restaurant
Captain, Permit/Vessel Owner, and Dealer
Dealer/Ex-Vessel Owner
Missing Response
TOTAL

Number of
Responses
16
76
94
1
1
1
1
3
1
61
255

Percent
6.3
29.8
36.9
0.4
0.4
0.4
0.4
1.2
0.4
23.9
100.0

Valid
Percent
8.2
39.2
48.5
0.5
0.5
0.5
0.5
1.5
0.5
100.0

In order to measure the size of a commercial fisher’s operation for
analysis, the survey asked about the historical landings during the qualifying
years for the IFQ program (1999-2004). The original data reflect 12 ranges of
landings, from less than 1,000 pounds to greater than 90,000 pounds. More than
half of all commercial permit holders claimed that their landings fell within one of
the three smallest groups (Table 5).
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Table 5: Responses to Size of Operation (survey question 6c)*
Historical Landings
(Annual Average Pounds Landed
Between 1999-2004)
Less than 1,000
1,000 – 5,000
5,001 – 10,000
10,001 – 20 ,000
20,001 – 30 ,000
30,001 – 40 ,000
40,001 – 50 ,000
50,001 – 60 ,000
60,001 – 70 ,000
70,001 – 80 ,000
80,001 – 90 ,000
Greater than 90,000
Missing Response
TOTAL

Number of
Responses

Percent

Valid
Percent

50
46
28
15
8
10
5
4
2
1
3
4
79
255

19.6
18.0
11.0
5.9
3.1
3.9
2.0
1.6
0.8
0.4
1.2
1.6
31.0
100.0

28.4
26.1
15.9
8.5
4.5
5.7
2.8
2.3
1.1
0.6
1.7
2.3
100.0

*61 of the missing responses correspond to the 61 respondents who are not commercial fishers,
and thus were not asked to specify historical landings. The remaining 18 elected not to answer
this particular question.

For purposes of data analysis, responses to the various survey questions
were combined and recoded into new categories. To determine different
perspectives based on affiliation with the grouper and tilefish fisheries, answers
to survey question 1 were divided into two groups to determine affiliation with the
fisheries: IFQ participants and non-IFQ participants. Respondents who
answered as dealer or any variation of commercial fisher, regardless of other
affiliations, were grouped together in the “IFQ participants” category while all
others were regrouped as “non-IFQ participants” (Table 6). For the purpose of
this study, “IFQ participants” are respondents who own a commercial reef fish
permit or reef fish dealer permit, and thus are active participants in the grouper
and tilefish commercial fisheries. All others (non- IFQ participants) are
respondents who do not actively participate in the commercial fisheries.
Respondents who refer to themselves as a commercial fisher or dealer and
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something else (i.e. commercial fisher and charterboat) are still considered IFQ
participants because they have the opportunity and means to be active
participants in the IFQ program by owning a commercial reef fish permit.
Recreational fishers do not require a permit to fish for grouper or tilefish, and thus
are not considered “IFQ participants”. The IFQ program only pertains to
commercial fishers and dealers in the two fisheries.
Similar to the results for affiliation, each question posed to commercial
fishers allowed respondents to write in answers under an “other” option, which
resulted in a large number of categories. Therefore, responses to questions
pertaining to their operations were also recoded for data analysis purposes.
Gear types were recoded into four categories: handline, bandit, spear, and
longline (Table 6). In order to recode into as few categories as possible,
responses with similarities were grouped together. Employees of the National
Marine Fisheries Service provided advice on gear types and their similarities.
For purposes of this study, “rod and reel” is synonymous with “handline” as is
“electric reel” and “bandit”. National Marine Fisheries Service employees also
indicated commercial fishers with bandit gear will oftentimes have both bandit
gear as well as handline gear but not vice versa. As a result, responses
indicating both bandit and handline were regrouped into the bandit category.
As with responses to the gear type question, the 194 responses to survey
question 6b (role within the fisheries) were re-coded into fewer groups. Original
responses fell into nine categories but were re-coded into three groups: captain,
permit/vessel owner, and both captain and permit/vessel owner. Landings were
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also regrouped into two categories: small scale (less than or equal to 10,000
pounds), and large scale (greater than 10,000 pounds) (Table 6). According to
the Gulf of Mexico Fishery Management Council, a reef fish permit holder who
lands 8,000 pounds or more each year is considered to be a “substantial
participant” (Gulf of Mexico Fishery Management Council, 2008). Although the
majority of the commercial fishers are below the 8,000 pound level (Table 6), and
thus are not considered substantial participants, fishers who are above the 8,000
pound level account for about 89% of all grouper and tilefish landings (NMFS,
2009b).
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Table 6: New Categories for Data Analysis
Original Affiliation Response
Dealer
Commercial Fisher
Dealer and Commercial Fisher
Commercial and Recreational Fisher
Dealer, Commercial, and Recreational Fisher
Commercial Fisher and Charterboat
Dealer, Commercial Fisher, and Restaurant
Vessel Owner/Seafood Market Owner
Recreational Fisher
Government Agency
Environmental Group/NGO
Charterboat
Recreational Fisher and Charterboat
University Professor
Research Scientist
University Professor and Research Scientist
Recreational Fisher and Research Scientist
Previous Federal Employee
Unsure
Recreational Fisher and Fishing Rights Lobbyist
Original Gear Type Response
Handline/Rod & Reel
Handline and Spear
Bandit
Handline and Bandit
Handline/Rod & Reel, Bandit, and Spear
Electric Reel
Spear
Dive
Longline
Bandit and Longline

Percentage

IFQ Participant

85.4

Non-IFQ Participant

14.6

New Category
Gear Type

Percentage

Handline

35.6

Bandit

49.0

Spear

4.6

Longline

10.8

New Category
Role
Captain

Original Role Response
Captain
Permit/Vessel Owner
Dealer/Ex-Vessel Owner
Captain and Permit/Vessel Owner
Captain, Permit/Vessel Owner, and Diver
Captain, Permit/Vessel Owner, and Crew
Captain, Permit/Vessel Owner, and Operator
Captain, Permit/Vessel Owner, and Restaurant
Captain, Permit/Vessel Owner, and Dealer

New Category
Affiliation

Percentage
8.2

Permit/Vessel Owner

39.7

Both Captain and Permit/Vessel Owner

52.0

New Category
Historical Landings

Percentage

Small

70.4

Large

29.5

Original Historical Landings Response
Less than 1,000
1,000 – 5,000
5,001 – 10,000
10,001 – 20 ,000
20,001 – 30 ,000
30,001 – 40 ,000
40,001 – 50 ,000
50,001 – 60 ,000
60,001 – 70 ,000
70,001 – 80 ,000
80,001 – 90 ,000
Greater than 90,000
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Tables 7a and 7b outline responses to each survey question from the
group of respondents as a whole. Table 7a specifies the total number of
respondents that answered either “yes” or “no” to each of the survey questions 3,
4, 5, 7a, 8a, and 8b. These responses reveal that many more people, in general,
expect negative effects on the fisheries and IFQ participants’ personal
operations. Likewise, less people indicated that they expect positive effects on
both the fisheries and personal operations of those involved. On the other hand,
fewer than half of all respondents expect the online system to cause problems for
fishers or dealers. Overall, however, more people responded that they do not
believe the IFQ program is an improvement over previous management
methods.

Table 7a: Total Number of Yes and No Responses to Survey Questions 3, 4, 5,
7a, 8a, and 8b
Improvement over current methods
Positive effects on the fisheries
Negative effects on the fisheries
Online system cause problems
Positive effects on personal operations
Negative effects on personal operations

n
247
246
242
206
209
208

Yes
103
119
195
88
63
171

No
144
127
47
118
146
37

Table 7b summarizes the mean responses for the remaining survey
questions. The results (a mean response of 4.06 on a scale of 1 to 5, with 1
representing “not at all familiar” and 5 representing “very familiar”) indicate that,
on average, respondents are familiar with the IFQ program. Respondents
generally agree that the program will foster consolidation of IFQ shares.
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Respondents also agree, on average, that the program will result in a decrease
in the number of vessels able to fish for grouper and tilefish in the Gulf of Mexico.
Alternatively, respondents disagree with statements such as: bycatch will decline,
it will be easier for new fishers to enter the fisheries, job opportunities will
increase, prefer IFQs over previous management methods, and IFQ shares will
be fairly allocated among participants. On average, respondents also disagree
that allocating private property rights is a good idea, that IFQ participants will be
better off financially under the new program, and that more fisheries should be
managed under IFQ programs. Survey respondents, as a whole, expressed less
certainty about other aspects of the program, such as whether or not it would
result in a longer fishing season, increase safety at sea, enforcement, or profits,
end the race for fish, or act as an effective means to protect the grouper and
tilefish stocks. They were also not convinced the IFQ program would allow for
fishers to participate in more sustainable fishing practices or make management
of the fisheries more flexible.
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Table 7b: Mean Responses from All Surveys*

Familiar with the program
Longer Fishing Season
Bycatch/Discards will decline
Increased safety
Increase profits due to higher market prices
Increase enforcement
End the race for fish
Effective means to protect stocks
Easier for new fishers to enter the fisheries
Reduce the number of vessels
Allow for more sustainable practices
Make management more flexible
Private property rights is a good idea
Consolidation is a serious concern
Increase job opportunities
Fairly allocate shares among participants
Participants will be better off financially
Prefer IFQ over previous methods
More fisheries should be managed with IFQ

n

Mean

253
236
239
230
237
243
238
244
244
246
238
238
235
239
230
242
240
239
239

4.06
2.94
3.87
3.13
3.18
2.63
2.83
3.30
4.36
1.65
3.24
3.44
3.62
2.06
4.28
3.99
3.70
3.58
3.77

Standard
Deviation
1.101
1.612
1.409
1.604
1.457
1.444
1.591
1.568
1.179
1.121
1.570
1.468
1.458
1.360
1.126
1.371
1.490
1.588
1.484

*The question regarding familiarity is rated on a scale of 1 to 5, with 1 representing “not at all
familiar” and 5 representing “very familiar”. All other questions were rated on a scale on 1 to 5,
with 1 representing “strongly agree” and 5 representing “strongly disagree”.

The most statistically significant differences were found when comparing
responses of IFQ participants with those of non-IFQ participants (Tables 8a and
8b). The statistical tests show that for 21 of the 22 questions, these two groups
provided statistically significant different mean responses. The only question that
did not result in a statistically significant difference was regarding the familiarity of
the IFQ program. Responses from both participants and non-participants
indicated they are fairly familiar with the program, thus providing no statistically
significant difference.
The points of disagreement include whether or not respondents see the
IFQ program as an improvement over current management methods or if they
expect positive effects on the fisheries. In both these cases, non-participants
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had a higher proportion of yes responses, indicating that non-IFQ participants
have more confidence in the IFQ program. In terms of specific expected
outcomes, on average, IFQ participants were not convinced that the program
would cause a longer fishing season, increased safety at sea, increased profits,
or an increase in enforcement. Non-IFQ participants, on average, rated those
statements lower on the scale, indicating they expect those outcomes. Similarly,
non-IFQ participants were also likely to agree that the program would end the
race for fish and allow for more sustainable fishing practices while participants
were neutral or unconvinced these outcomes would occur. Mean responses
indicate participants were also more skeptical about claims that the IFQ program
is an effective means to protect fish stocks while non-participants expressed
much more confidence with such an idea. IFQ participants were more likely to
disagree that participants would be better off financially under the IFQ program,
that more fisheries should be managed under IFQ programs, management would
be more flexible, and that they prefer the IFQ program over previous
management methods, whereas non-participants generally accepted these
statements about IFQs.
IFQ participants also differed with non-participants in their responses to
statements about declining bycatch and discards and that allocating private
property rights is a good idea. Non-participants, on average, did not express
clear views on these issues while participants flatly disagreed with these
statements. Similarly, on average, IFQ participants also disagreed that the
program would increase job opportunities or fairly allocate shares among
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shareholders while non-IFQ participants expressed much less certainty. Nonparticipants were also more likely to be neutral in their concern over
consolidation whereas participants agreed that consolidation is a concern. When
confronted with the statement that it would be easy for new fishers to enter the
fishery, both groups disagreed. However, IFQ participants’ mean responses
indicate they have a stronger disagreement with this statement than nonparticipants. Likewise, both groups, on average, agreed with the statement that
the program would reduce the number of vessels available to fish.
Table 8a: Results of proportion testing comparing responses from IFQ
participants and non-IFQ participants
Affiliation
IFQ Participant
Improvement over
current methods
Non- Participant
IFQ Participant
Positive effects
on the fisheries
Non- Participant
IFQ Participant
Negative effects
on the fisheries
Non- Participant
* Significant Difference (α = 0.05)

n
212
35
212
34
210
32

Proportion of Yes
0.3396
0.8857
0.4151
0.9118
0.8286
0.6563
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z-value

p-value

-6.07

< 0.0001*

-5.38

< 0.0001*

2.30

0.0217*

Table 8b: Results of two-tailed t-test comparing responses from IFQ participants
and non-IFQ participants
Affiliation
IFQ Participant
Non- Participant
IFQ Participant
Longer Fishing Season
Non- Participant
IFQ Participant
Bycatch/Discards
will decline
Non- Participant
IFQ Participant
Increased safety
Non- Participant
IFQ Participant
Increase profits due to
higher market prices
Non- Participant
IFQ Participant
Increase enforcement
Non- Participant
IFQ Participant
End the race for fish
Non- Participant
Effective means to protect IFQ Participant
stocks
Non- Participant
IFQ Participant
Easier for new fishers to
enter the fisheries
Non- Participant
IFQ Participant
Reduce the number
of vessels
Non- Participant
IFQ Participant
Allow for more
sustainable practices
Non- Participant
IFQ Participant
Make management more
flexible
Non- Participant
Private property rights is a IFQ Participant
good idea
Non- Participant
Consolidation is a serious IFQ Participant
concern
Non- Participant
IFQ Participant
Increase job opportunities
Non- Participant
IFQ Participant
Fairly allocate shares
among participants
Non- Participant
IFQ Participant
Participants will be better
off financially
Non- Participant
IFQ Participant
Prefer IFQ over previous
methods
Non- Participant
IFQ Participant
More fisheries should be
managed with IFQ
Non- Participant
* Significant Difference (α = 0.05)
Familiar with the program

n

Mean

216
37
201
35
204
35
196
34
203
34
208
35
203
35
210
34
209
35
211
35
204
34
205
33
202
33
204
35
198
32
207
35
206
34
205
34
204
35

4.09
3.84
3.12
1.94
4.06
2.80
3.34
1.94
3.34
2.24
2.72
2.06
3.00
1.86
3.49
2.18
4.43
3.91
1.59
2.03
3.44
2.06
3.62
2.30
3.76
2.76
1.93
2.83
4.41
3.44
4.16
2.97
3.93
2.32
3.77
2.41
4.00
2.49

Standard
Deviation
1.057
1.323
1.592
1.349
1.352
1.256
1.589
1.099
1.472
0.923
1.487
0.998
1.594
1.192
1.563
1.053
1.155
1.245
1.128
1.014
1.538
1.205
1.422
1.237
1.458
1.146
1.348
1.175
1.081
1.045
1.325
1.200
1.428
1.065
1.575
1.104
1.447
0.951

t-value

Degrees of
Freedom

p-value

1.112

44.210

0.272

4.628

51.976

0.000*

5.139

237

0.000*

6.365

59.906

0.000*

5.844

65.155

0.000*

3.358

62.698

0.001*

4.939

57.281

0.000*

6.203

59.264

0.000*

2.421

242

0.016*

-2.171

244

0.031*

5.934

52.741

0.000*

5.552

46.722

0.000*

4.456

50.574

0.000*

-3.701

237

0.000*

4.764

228

0.000*

4.969

240

0.000*

7.710

54.700

0.000*

6.205

57.970

0.000*

7.944

64.669

0.000*

The next largest statistical differences were found by comparing large
scale operations with small scale operations (Tables 9a and 9b) with answers to
21 of the 25 questions significantly different. Hypothesis testing indicates that
large operators had a statistically significant higher proportion of yes responses
than smaller scale fishers when asked if they saw the IFQ program as an
improvement over previous management measures. When responding about
expected positive outcomes of the program, small operators had a lower
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proportion of yes responses regarding effects on both the fisheries and personal
operations. Similarly, small operators had a higher proportion of yes responses
to questions concerning negative effects on the grouper and tilefish fisheries and
their businesses. Analysis on proportion of yes responses to whether or not the
online system would create problems did not result in a statistically significant
difference between large and small operators.
The t-test indicates that large and small operations had statistically
significant differences in their familiarity with the program. Large operations, on
average, indicated they were more familiar than small operators. In terms of
specific potential impacts of the IFQ program, large operators were more likely to
agree that the IFQ program would end the race for fish and increase enforcement
while small scale fishers expressed less confidence in these program outcomes.
On the other hand, small operators tended to disagree with ideas such as
increased safety, more flexible management under the IFQ program, preference
for IFQ programs over previous methods of management, and IFQ programs are
an effective means to protect fish stocks. On average, large scale fishers held
less certain views on these topics. Similarly, small scale fishers tended to
disagree with the notions that private property rights are a good idea and that
IFQ participants will be better off financially under the new program while large
operators’ responses reflected less certainty on these issues. Along the same
lines, large scale fishers were less convinced that more fisheries should be
managed with IFQs or that the programs allows fishers to practice more
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sustainable fishing activities whereas small operations disagreed with such
ideas.
Both small and large scale fishers were uncertain that there would be an
increase in profits due to increased fish prices or a longer fishing season but
small operators reflected less certainty. While large and small operators, on
average, both disagreed that new fishers can easily enter the fishery, that the
IFQ program would increase job opportunities, and that shares will be fairly
distributed between participants, the mean responses provided by small scale
fishers indicate that they are in stronger disagreement than large operators.
Finally, both groups agreed that the IFQ program would reduce the number of
vessels available to fish for grouper and tilefish in the Gulf of Mexico and that
consolidation is a serious concern facing the fisheries and the IFQ program.
Table 9a: Results of proportion testing comparing responses from large scale
operations and small scale operations
Size of Operation
Large Operations
Improvement over
current methods
Small Operations
Large Operations
Positive effects
on the fisheries
Small Operations
Large Operations
Negative effects
on the fisheries
Small Operations
Large Operations
Online system
cause problems
Small Operations
Large Operations
Positive effects on
personal operations
Small Operations
Large Operations
Negative effects on
personal operations
Small Operations
* Significant Difference (α = 0.05)

n
51
122
50
122
49
121
51
118
48
121
49
120

Proportion of Yes
0.5686
0.2377
0.6200
0.3197
0.6939
0.9008
0.3725
0.4831
0.6667
0.1736
0.7347
0.8583
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z-value

p-value

4.20

<0.0001*

3.64

0.0003*

-3.34

0.0008*

-1.33

0.1850

6.23

<0.0001*

-1.91

0.0563

Table 9b: Results of t-test comparing responses from large scale operations and
small scale operations
Size of
Operation
Large Operations
Familiar with the program
Small Operations
Large Operations
Longer Fishing Season
Small Operations
Large Operations
Bycatch/Discards
will decline
Small Operations
Large Operations
Increased safety
Small Operations
Large Operations
Increase profits due to
higher market prices
Small Operations
Large Operations
Increase enforcement
Small Operations
Large Operations
End the race for fish
Small Operations
Large Operations
Effective means to protect
stocks
Small Operations
Large Operations
Easier for new fishers to
enter the fisheries
Small Operations
Large Operations
Reduce the number
of vessels
Small Operations
Large Operations
Allow for more
sustainable practices
Small Operations
Large Operations
Make management more
flexible
Small Operations
Large Operations
Private property rights is a
good idea
Small Operations
Large Operations
Consolidation is a serious
concern
Small Operations
Large Operations
Increase job opportunities
Small Operations
Large Operations
Fairly allocate shares
among participants
Small Operations
Large Operations
Participants will be better
off financially
Small Operations
Large Operations
Prefer IFQ over previous
methods
Small Operations
Large Operations
More fisheries should be
managed with IFQ
Small Operations
* Significant Difference (α = 0.05)

n

Mean

52
123
49
117
52
116
49
113
50
116
52
119
48
117
51
121
50
121
52
121
48
119
49
118
49
117
49
118
48
115
50
120
50
119
49
118
49
118

4.48
3.93
2.69
3.29
3.73
4.26
2.55
3.63
2.80
3.47
2.08
2.98
2.35
3.13
2.86
3.74
4.10
4.53
1.67
1.54
2.69
3.70
3.02
3.87
3.20
4.00
1.98
1.85
4.02
4.61
3.54
4.51
3.34
4.19
3.04
4.13
3.45
4.25

Standard
Deviation
0.828
1.088
1.610
1.526
1.510
1.195
1.473
1.507
1.578
1.348
1.398
1.450
1.578
1.489
1.637
1.441
1.329
1.096
1.080
1.133
1.600
1.381
1.479
1.304
1.527
1.333
1.315
1.279
1.229
0.915
1.581
0.996
1.636
1.244
1.755
1.381
1.595
1.294

t-value

Degrees of
Freedom

p-value

3.289

173

0.001*

-2.261

164

0.025*

-2.228

80.849

0.029*

-4.207

160

0.000*

-2.601

81.235

0.011*

-3.801

169

0.000*

-2.981

163

0.003*

-3.516

170

0.001*

-2.017

77.915

0.047*

0.733

171

0.464

-4.082

165

0.000*

-3.695

165

0.000*

-3.359

164

0.001*

0.603

165

0.547

-2.987

69.716

0.004*

-4.013

65.804

0.000*

-3.307

73.868

0.001*

-3.864

73.835

0.000*

-3.099

75.502

0.003*

Comparisons were also made based on gear type. Each gear type was
compared to the other gear types combined. For instance, responses made by
spear fishers were compared to all other gears (handline, longline, and bandit).
Results varied when comparing respondents using different gear types. The
proportion testing comparing spear fisher responses those of other gear users
resulted in inconclusive results due to small sample size of spear fishers.
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The t-test comparing spear fishers and other gear type users resulted in 7
out of 19 questions statistically significantly different (Table 10). Spear fishers,
on average, disagreed with the ideas of the IFQ program ending the race for fish,
allowing for more sustainable fishing practices, and the program as an effective
means to protect the grouper and tilefish fisheries while other gear users
provided more neutral responses. Other questions resulting in statistically
significant differences pertained to the decline in bycatch, fair distribution of IFQ
shares, increase in job opportunities, and financial improvement under the IFQ
program. Both groups disagreed with these ideas, however, spear fishers’ mean
responses indicate stronger disagreements than other gear type users.
The mean response from spear fishers was not statistically significantly
different from the mean response of other gear users when confronted with
statements that the grouper and tilefish IFQ program will make it easier for new
fishers to enter the fisheries and increase flexibility of management: both groups
disagreed with these propositions. Moreover, both groups also expressed
concern over consolidation of IFQ shares. Both spear fishers as well as users of
other gear types were unsure about whether or not the IFQ program will result in
a longer fishing season. Other similarities in mean responses can be seen in
table 10.
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Table 10: Results of two-tailed t-test comparing responses from spear fishers
and all other gear types
Gear
Spear
Familiar with the program
Others
Spear
Longer Fishing Season
Others
Spear
Bycatch/Discards
will decline
Others
Spear
Increased safety
Others
Spear
Increase profits due to
higher market prices
Others
Spear
Increase enforcement
Others
Spear
End the race for fish
Others
Effective means to protect Spear
stocks
Others
Spear
Easier for new fishers to
enter the fisheries
Others
Spear
Reduce the number
of vessels
Others
Spear
Allow for more
sustainable practices
Others
Spear
Make management more
flexible
Others
Private property rights is a Spear
good idea
Others
Consolidation is a serious Spear
concern
Others
Spear
Increase job opportunities
Others
Spear
Fairly allocate shares
among participants
Others
Spear
Participants will be better
off financially
Others
Spear
Prefer IFQ over previous
methods
Others
Spear
More fisheries should be
managed with IFQ
Others
* Significant Difference (α = 0.05)

n

Mean

9
184
9
170
9
174
9
168
9
172
9
178
9
172
9
179
9
178
9
180
9
173
9
174
9
172
9
175
9
169
9
177
9
176
9
175
9
174

3.78
4.13
3.22
3.17
4.89
4.05
4.00
3.35
4.00
3.30
3.44
2.71
4.56
2.92
4.56
3.44
4.56
4.41
1.22
1.59
4.56
3.40
3.56
3.64
4.44
3.73
2.22
1.92
5.00
4.41
5.00
4.17
4.89
3.90
4.22
3.80
4.33
4.00

Standard
Deviation
1.093
1.051
1.787
1.584
0.333
1.353
1.500
1.571
1.323
1.447
1.424
1.497
1.014
1.564
1.33
1.562
1.333
1.167
0.441
1.142
1.014
1.524
1.667
1.402
1.130
1.459
1.716
1.332
0.000
1.060
0.000
1.316
0.333
1.437
1.394
1.579
1.414
1.447

t-value

Degrees of
Freedom

p-value

-0.966

191

0.335

0.095

177

0.925

5.537

26.541

0.000*

1.209

175

0.228

1.427

179

0.155

1.443

185

0.151

4.552

10.108

0.001*

2.425

9.140

0.038*

0.362

185

0.717

-0.957

187

0.340

3.238

9.985

0.009*

-0.182

181

0.856

1.451

179

0.148

0.654

182

0.514

7.256

168

0.000*

8.395

176

0.000*

6.351

29.224

0.000*

0.786

182

0.433

0.675

181

0.501

Responses made by longline fishers compared to users of all other gear
types determined eight significant differences (Tables 11a and 11b). Differences
were seen with responses regarding positive impacts on their personal
operations: longline fishers had a higher proportion of yes responses than other
gear type users. Alternatively, fishers of other gear types had a statistically
significant higher proportion of yes responses when considering negative effects
on their personal operations. Mean responses of longline fishers indicated they
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were more familiar with the IFQ program than users of other gear types. As a
group, they also expressed, on average, less clear opinions on the flexibility of
managing the fisheries under the IFQ program, private property rights as a good
idea, financial improvement of IFQ participants, and their preference of IFQ over
previous management methods. On average, users of other gear types
disagreed with each of these ideas. Both groups disagreed that the IFQ shares
would be fairly distributed among the fishers, however, other gear type users had
a stronger disagreement than longline fishers. Responses from longline fishers,
however, did not significantly differ from users of other gear types in some
statements. Both groups agreed that the IFQ program would reduce of the
number of vessels and that consolidation of IFQ shares is a serious concern.
Similarly, both longline fishers and other gear type users were uncertain about
the potential for the IFQ program to end the race for fish. Table 11b outlines
other similarities in mean responses of both longline fishers and fishers using
other types.

Table 11a: Results of proportion testing comparing responses from longline
fishers and all other gear types
Gear
Longline
Improvement over
current methods
Others
Longline
Positive effects
on the fisheries
Others
Longline
Negative effects
on the fisheries
Others
Longline
Online system
cause problems
Others
Longline
Positive effects on
personal operations
Others
Longline
Negative effects on
personal operations
Others
* Significant Difference (α = 0.05)

n
21
169
21
169
21
167
21
165
21
166
21
165

Proportion of Yes
0.4762
0.3136
0.5238
0.3846
0.7143
0.8683
0.3333
0.4667
0.5238
0.2771
0.6667
0.8606
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z-value

p-value

1.49

0.1356

1.23

0.2195

-1.87

0.0618

-1.16

0.2475

2.31

0.0207*

-2.28

0.0229*

Table 11b: Results of two-tailed t-test comparing responses from longline fishers
and all other gear types
Familiar with the program
Longer Fishing Season
Bycatch/Discards
will decline
Increased safety
Increase profits due to higher
market prices
Increase enforcement
End the race for fish
Effective means to protect
stocks
Easier for new fishers to enter
the fisheries
Reduce the number
of vessels
Allow for more sustainable
practices
Make management more
flexible
Private property rights is a
good idea
Consolidation is a serious
concern
Increase job opportunities
Fairly allocate shares among
participants
Participants will be better off
financially
Prefer IFQ over previous
methods
More fisheries should be
managed with IFQ
* Significant Difference (α = 0.05)

Gear

n

Mean

Longline
Others
Longline
Others
Longline
Others
Longline
Others
Longline
Others
Longline
Others
Longline
Others
Longline
Others
Longline
Others
Longline
Others
Longline
Others
Longline
Others
Longline
Others
Longline
Others
Longline
Others
Longline
Others
Longline
Others
Longline
Others
Longline
Others

21
172
20
159
21
162
20
157
21
160
21
166
20
161
21
167
21
166
21
168
20
162
18
165
19
162
20
164
19
159
21
165
21
164
21
163
20
163

4.57
4.05
2.70
3.23
3.81
4.13
3.25
3.40
2.76
3.41
2.29
2.80
2.90
3.02
3.10
3.54
4.19
4.45
1.43
1.59
2.95
3.52
2.83
3.73
3.05
3.85
1.90
1.94
3.89
4.50
3.52
4.30
3.10
4.06
3.10
3.91
3.50
4.08

Standard
Deviation
0.746
1.072
1.809
1.556
1.504
1.310
1.618
1.568
1.609
1.411
1.488
1.494
1.683
1.571
1.670
1.551
1.289
1.157
0.926
1.144
1.701
1.492
1.543
1.372
1.508
1.425
1.252
1.364
1.286
0.993
1.632
1.226
1.670
1.351
1.670
1.537
1.573
1.418

t-value

Degrees of
Freedom

p-value

2.154

191

0.033*

-1.417

177

0.158

-1.036

181

0.302

-0.405

175

0.686

-1.935

179

0.055

-1.490

185

0.138

-0.316

179

0.752

-1.241

186

0.216

-0.940

185

0.348

-0.618

187

0.537

-1.583

180

0.115

-2.593

181

0.010*

-2.281

179

0.024*

-0.122

182

0.903

-1.992

20.642

0.060

-2.098

22.963

0.047*

-2.999

183

0.003*

-2.275

182

0.024*

-1.705

181

0.090

Table 12a demonstrates the similar proportion of yes responses to each
question for both handline and other gear users. A comparison of handline
fishers vs. all others resulted in four significant differences (Table 12b). Both
groups, on average, unsure about the effects the IFQ program would have on
enforcement, however, whereas users of other gear types had a lower mean
response. Other points of distinction between handline fishers and all other gear
types are their opinions on the following statements: prefer IFQ programs over
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other management methods, more fisheries should be managed under these
types of programs, and the IFQ shares will be fair distributed among participants.
While both groups disagree with the statements, handline fishers’ mean
responses indicate they have stronger disagreements with these statements than
users of other gear types. However, both groups provided similar answers in
agreement on some aspects, including the idea that bycatch will not decline, the
number of vessels fishing for grouper and tilefish will be reduced, and it will be
harder for new fishers to enter the fishery. Different gear users also agree about
their concern of consolidation and the potential decrease in job opportunities.
Other similarities in mean responses can be seen in tables 12b.

Table 12a: Results of proportion testing comparing responses from handline
fishers and all other gear types
Improvement over
current methods
Positive effects
on the fisheries
Negative effects
on the fisheries
Online system
cause problems
Positive effects on
personal operations
Negative effects on
personal operations

Gear
Handline
Others
Handline
Others
Handline
Others
Handline
Others
Handline
Others
Handline
Others

n
68
122
67
123
68
120
67
119
68
119
66
120

Proportion of Yes
0.2794
0.3607
0.3433
0.4309
0.8676
0.8417
0.4776
0.4370
0.2206
0.3529
0.8636
0.8250
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z-value

p-value

-1.14

0.2541

-1.18

0.2389

0.48

0.6307

0.53

0.5929

-1.89

0.0586

0.69

0.4930

Table 12b: Results of two-tailed t-test comparing responses from handline fishers
and all other gear types

Familiar with the program
Longer Fishing Season
Bycatch/Discards
will decline
Increased safety
Increase profits due to higher
market prices
Increase enforcement
End the race for fish
Effective means to protect
stocks
Easier for new fishers to enter
the fisheries
Reduce the number
of vessels
Allow for more sustainable
practices
Make management more flexible
Private property rights is a good
idea
Consolidation is a serious
concern
Increase job opportunities
Fairly allocate shares among
participants
Participants will be better off
financially
Prefer IFQ over previous
methods
More fisheries should be
managed with IFQ
* Significant Difference (α = 0.05)

Gear

n

Mean

Handline
Others
Handline
Others
Handline
Others
Handline
Others
Handline
Others
Handline
Others
Handline
Others
Handline
Others
Handline
Others
Handline
Others
Handline
Others
Handline
Others
Handline
Others
Handline
Others
Handline
Others
Handline
Others
Handline
Others
Handline
Others
Handline
Others

68
125
61
118
60
123
62
115
64
117
66
121
64
117
66
122
66
121
66
123
63
119
65
118
62
119
64
120
62
116
66
120
64
121
65
119
64
119

3.97
4.18
3.33
3.09
4.28
4.00
3.61
3.26
3.61
3.18
3.08
2.56
3.22
2.89
3.59
3.44
4.39
4.43
1.70
1.50
3.65
3.35
3.80
3.55
4.02
3.63
2.03
1.88
4.63
4.34
4.48
4.06
4.19
3.83
4.12
3.66
4.28
3.87

Standard
Deviation
1.065
1.043
1.491
1.638
1180
1.397
1.497
1.601
1.387
1.460
1.471
1.488
1.474
1.628
1.425
1.642
1.263
1.124
1.265
1.035
1.393
1.582
1.337
1.448
1.312
1.506
1.403
1.323
0.854
1.119
1.070
1.386
1.246
1.493
1.398
1.639
1.201
1.543

t-value

Degrees of
Freedom

p-value

-1.348

191

0.179

0.936

177

0.351

1.353

181

0.178

1.427

175

0.155

1.927

179

0.056

2.265

185

0.025*

1.346

179

0.180

0.645

150.257

0.520

-0.199

185

0.842

1.129

187

0.261

1.308

140.994

0.193

1.144

181

0.254

1.783

139.543

0.077

0.707

182

0.480

1.950

155.044

0.053

2.335

163.975

0.021*

1.748

149.702

0.082

2.039

150.253

0.043*

1.974

158.010

0.050*

Finally, a comparison between bandit fishers with users of other gear
types resulted in just one significant difference: ending the race for fish (Tables
13a and 13b). Bandit fishers barely agreed that the IFQ program would end the
race for fish but other gear type users were less certain about whether or not that
would happen. Some similarities in mean responses were also observed. Both
groups disagreed that it would be easier for new fishers to enter the fisheries,
there would be an increase in job opportunities, and the IFQ program will fairly
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allocate shares among fishers. On the other hand, both groups agreed that the
number of vessels available to harvest grouper and tilefish in the Gulf of Mexico
would be reduced. A concern over consolidation was also shared by both bandit
users and those who use other gear types. Other similarities are outlined in table
13b.

Table 13a: Results of proportion testing comparing responses from bandit
fishers and all other gear types
Improvement over
current methods
Positive effects
on the fisheries
Negative effects
on the fisheries
Online system
cause problems
Positive effects on
personal operations
Negative effects on
personal operations

Gear
Bandit
Others
Bandit
Others
Bandit
Others
Bandit
Others
Bandit
Others
Bandit
Others

n
92
98
93
97
90
95
90
96
90
97
91
95

Proportion of Yes
0.3587
0.3061
0.4194
0.3814
0.8556
0.8469
0.4444
0.4583
0.3444
0.2680
0.8462
0.8316
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z-value

p-value

0.77

0.4417

0.53

0.5939

0.17

0.8683

-0.19

0.8491

1.13

0.2568

0.27

0.7870

Table 13b: Results of two-tailed t-test comparing responses from bandit fishers
and all other gear types
Gear
Bandit
Others
Bandit
Others
Bandit
Others
Bandit
Increased safety
Others
Increase profits due to Bandit
higher market prices
Others
Bandit
Increase enforcement
Others
Bandit
End the race for fish
Others
Bandit
Effective means to
protect stocks
Others
Bandit
Easier for new fishers
to enter the fisheries
Others
Bandit
Reduce the number
of vessels
Others
Bandit
Allow for more
sustainable practices
Others
Bandit
Make management
more flexible
Others
Private property rights Bandit
is a good idea
Others
Bandit
Consolidation is a
serious concern
Others
Bandit
Increase job
opportunities
Others
Bandit
Fairly allocate shares
among participants
Others
Bandit
Participants will be
better off financially
Others
Bandit
Prefer IFQ over
previous methods
Others
Bandit
More fisheries should
be managed with IFQ
Others
* Significant Difference (α = 0.05)
Familiar with the
program
Longer Fishing
Season
Bycatch/Discards
will decline

n

Mean

95
98
89
90
93
90
86
91
87
94
91
96
88
93
92
96
91
96
93
96
90
92
91
92
91
90
91
93
88
90
90
96
91
94
89
95
90
93

4.14
4.08
3.17
3.18
3.96
4.23
3.19
3.57
3.20
3.46
2.54
2.94
2.72
3.28
3.41
3.57
4.47
4.36
1.55
1.59
3.32
3.59
3.69
3.59
3.67
3.86
1.85
2.02
4.36
4.51
4.09
4.32
3.89
4.01
3.73
3.91
3.91
4.12

Standard
Deviation
1.078
1.032
1.590
1.598
1.414
1.237
1.605
1.521
1.413
1.471
1.478
1.500
1.583
1.535
1.632
1.506
1.068
1.266
1.099
1.148
1.557
1.484
1.380
1.446
1.506
1.395
1.307
1.391
1.106
0.974
1.346
1.244
1.449
1.395
1.636
1.509
1.548
1.334

t-value

Degrees of
Freedom

p-value

0.363

191

0.717

-0.039

177

0.969

-1.406

181

0.162

-1.640

175

0.103

-1.220

179

0.224

-1.832

185

0.069

-2.432

179

0.016*

-0.698

186

0.486

0.629

185

0.530

-0.277

187

0.782

-1.175

180

0.242

0.504

181

0.615

-0.858

179

0.392

-0.881

182

0.380

-0.945

176

0.346

-1.232

184

0.219

-0.576

183

0.565

-0.754

182

0.452

-0.968

175.296

0.334

Roles of participants within the grouper and tilefish fisheries were also
analyzed relative to each survey question. Hypothesis testing did not result in
any statistically significant differences (Table 14a). However, comparisons
between responses from boat captains and all others using two-sample twotailed t-test reveal that answers to two of the 19 questions are statistically
significantly different (Table 14b). Boat captains are more strenuous in their
disagreement that new fishers will find it easy to enter the fishery as well as
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allocating private property rights in the grouper and tilefish fisheries is a good
idea. Both groups disagreed that it would be easy for new fishers to enter the
fishery, however, responses from boat captains had a higher mean, indicating
they had stronger opinions on the issue than other roles. Similarly, both groups
disagreed that private property rights are a good thing, but like the statement
regarding new fishers, boat captains had a stronger disagreement than the
others. Mean responses indicate both groups disagree that bycatch will decline,
job opportunities will increase, and IFQ shares will be fairly distributed among
fishers. They also agree that the number of vessels fishing for grouper and
tilefish will be reduced and disagree with the idea that more fisheries should be
managed under IFQ programs. Other statements that did not result in
statistically significant differences can also be seen in Tables 14a and 14b.

Table 14a: Results of proportion testing comparing responses from boat captains
and all other roles
Improvement over
current methods
Positive effects
on the fisheries
Negative effects
on the fisheries
Online system
cause problems
Positive effects on
personal operations
Negative effects on
personal operations

Gear
Boat Captain
Others
Boat Captain
Others
Boat Captain
Others
Boat Captain
Others
Boat Captain
Others
Boat Captain
Others

n
15
175
15
175
16
172
14
171
14
173
14
172

Proportion of Yes
0.3333
0.3371
0.4667
0.4000
0.6875
0.8605
0.2857
0.4620
0.2143
0.3179
0.9286
0.8314
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z-value

p-value

-0.03

0.9761

0.50

0.6137

-1.83

0.0669

-1.27

0.2023

-0.81

0.4201

0.95

0.3418

Table 14b: Results of two-tailed t-test comparing responses from boat captains
and all other roles
Role
Boat Captain
Others
Boat Captain
Longer Fishing Season
Others
Boat Captain
Bycatch/Discards
will decline
Others
Boat Captain
Increased safety
Others
Boat Captain
Increase profits due to
higher market prices
Others
Boat Captain
Increase enforcement
Others
Boat Captain
End the race for fish
Others
Boat Captain
Effective means to
protect stocks
Others
Boat Captain
Easier for new fishers
to enter the fisheries
Others
Boat Captain
Reduce the number
of vessels
Others
Boat Captain
Allow for more
sustainable practices
Others
Boat Captain
Make management
more flexible
Others
Boat Captain
Private property rights
is a good idea
Others
Boat Captain
Consolidation is a
serious concern
Others
Boat Captain
Increase job
opportunities
Others
Boat Captain
Fairly allocate shares
among participants
Others
Boat Captain
Participants will be
better off financially
Others
Boat Captain
Prefer IFQ over
previous methods
Others
Boat Captain
More fisheries should
be managed with IFQ
Others
* Significant Difference (α = 0.05)
Familiar with the
program

n

Mean

16
177
11
168
12
171
14
164
13
168
15
172
13
168
15
173
14
173
14
175
12
170
14
169
13
168
14
170
13
165
15
171
13
172
14
170
13
170

4.00
4.10
3.55
3.13
4.33
4.06
3.14
3.40
3.77
3.29
2.60
2.73
2.69
3.01
3.47
3.49
4.79
4.39
1.79
1.55
3.42
3.45
3.64
3.62
4.38
3.69
2.50
1.89
4.62
4.40
4.07
4.22
4.15
3.92
3.64
3.82
4.00
4.01

Standard
Deviation
1.414
1.028
1.572
1.594
1.303
1.338
1.562
1.573
1.166
1.457
1.595
1.490
1.843
1.561
1.685
1.557
0.579
1.203
1.311
1.107
1.730
1.507
1.499
1.418
1.044
1.480
1.698
1.312
0.768
1.092
1.387
1.292
1.345
1.427
1.906
1.544
1.581
1.437

t-value

Degrees of
Freedom

p-value

-0.366

191

0.715

0.848

177

0.398

0.674

181

0.501

-0.579

176

0.563

1.167

179

0.245

-0.329

185

0.743

-0.689

179

0.492

-0.045

186

0.964

2.217

23.462

0.037*

0.742

187

0.459

-0.067

180

0.947

0.069

181

0.945

2.230

15.997

0.040*

1.316

14.306

0.209

0.697

176

0.487

-0.445

184

0.657

0.561

183

0.575

-0.413

182

0.680

-0.014

181

0.989

When comparing permit/vessel owners vs. all others as well as responses
from those defined as both captains and permit/vessel owners vs. others, only
one of the questions resulted in statistically significant different responses for
each of the comparisons (see Tables 15a, 15b, 16a, 16b). Hypothesis testing did
not result in any significant differences (Tables 15a and 16a). In both analyses,
statistically significant differences were found only on the question about
familiarity with the IFQ program. Permit/vessel owners tended to be less familiar
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than other roles (Table 15b) and those who are both captain and owner were
more familiar than other roles (Table 16b). These results indicate that there is
little difference in the opinions of permit/vessel owners and those who both own
and operate their vessel when compared to other roles of participants. Table 15a
displays proportion of yes responses for each question and Table 15b outlines all
the mean responses. Similarly, other points of agreement between those who
are both captain and permit/vessel owners vs. other roles can be found in tables
16a and 16b.

Table 15a: Results of proportion testing comparing responses from permit/vessel
owners and all other roles
Improvement over
current methods
Positive effects
on the fisheries
Negative effects
on the fisheries
Online system
cause problems
Positive effects on
personal operations
Negative effects on
personal operations

Gear
Permit/Vessel Owner
Others
Permit/Vessel Owner
Others
Permit/Vessel Owner
Others
Permit/Vessel Owner
Others
Permit/Vessel Owner
Others
Permit/Vessel Owner
Others

n
76
114
76
114
76
112
73
112
75
112
75
111

Proportion of Yes
0.3684
0.3158
0.4474
0.3772
0.8421
0.8482
0.4658
0.4375
0.3467
0.2857
0.8133
0.8559

76

z-value

p-value

0.75

0.4521

0.97

0.3344

-0.11

0.9094

0.38

0.7057

0.88

0.3771

-0.77

0.4392

Table15b: Results of two-tailed t-test comparing responses from permit/vessel
owners and all other roles
Familiar with the
program
Longer Fishing
Season
Bycatch/Discards
will decline
Increased safety
Increase profits due
to higher market
prices
Increase
enforcement
End the race for fish

Role

n

Mean

Permit/Vessel Owner
Others
Permit/Vessel Owner
Others
Permit/Vessel Owner
Others
Permit/Vessel Owner
Others
Permit/Vessel Owner

77
116
74
105
73
110
73
105
76

3.87
4.24
3.00
3.26
4.00
4.14
3.44
3.33
3.18

Standard
Deviation
1.030
1.060
1.553
1.617
1.394
1.296
1.563
1.579
1.476

Others
Permit/Vessel Owner
Others
Permit/Vessel Owner
Others
Permit/Vessel Owner
Others
Permit/Vessel Owner

105
75
112
75
106
76
112
76

3.42
2.80
2.67
3.04
2.94
3.36
3.57
4.28

1.413
1.443
1.533
1.572
1.591
1.538
1.581
1.282

111
76
113
75
107
73
110
72
109
73
111
70
108
73
113
74
111
74
110
74

4.51
1.61
1.55
3.29
3.55
3.56
3.65
3.58
3.84
1.97
1.91
4.41
4.42
4.19
4.22
3.76
4.06
3.66
3.91
3.88

1.086
1.167
1.094
1.505
1.525
1.404
1.436
1.518
1.422
1.343
1.359
1.123
1.042
1.266
1.321
1.469
1.377
1.599
1.548
1.498
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4.09

1.405

Effective means to
protect stocks
Easier for new
fishers to enter the
Others
fisheries
Permit/Vessel Owner
Reduce the number
of vessels
Others
Permit/Vessel Owner
Allow for more
sustainable practices Others
Permit/Vessel Owner
Make management
more flexible
Others
Permit/Vessel Owner
Private property
rights is a good idea
Others
Permit/Vessel Owner
Consolidation is a
serious concern
Others
Permit/Vessel Owner
Increase job
opportunities
Others
Fairly allocate shares Permit/Vessel Owner
among participants
Others
Permit/Vessel Owner
Participants will be
better off financially
Others
Permit/Vessel Owner
Prefer IFQ over
previous methods
Others
More fisheries
Permit/Vessel Owner
should be managed
Others
with IFQ
* Significant Difference (α = 0.05)

t-value

Degrees of
Freedom

p-value

-2.409

191

0.017*

-1.065

177

0.288

-0.676

181

0.500

0.438

176

0.662

-1.083

179

0.280

0.583

185

0.560

0.404

179

0.686

-0.930

186

0.354

-1.321

143.258

0.189

0.339

187

0.735

-1.130

180

0.260

-0.432

181

0.666

-1.175

179

0.241

0.308

182

0.759

-0.014

176

0.988

-0.151

184

0.880

-1.443

183

0.151

-1.047

182

0.296

-0.982

181

0.328

Table 16a: Results of proportion testing comparing responses from respondents
defined as both captains and permit/vessel owners and all other roles
Improvement over
current methods
Positive effects
on the fisheries
Negative effects
on the fisheries
Online system
cause problems
Positive effects on
personal operations
Negative effects on
personal operations

Gear
Captain and Owner
Others
Captain and Owner
Others
Captain and Owner
Others
Captain and Owner
Others
Captain and Owner
Others
Captain and Owner
Others

n
99
91
99
91
96
92
98
87
98
89
97
89

Proportion of Yes
0.3131
0.3626
0.3636
0.4505
0.8750
0.8152
0.4592
0.4368
0.2959
0.3258
0.8454
0.8315
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z-value

p-value

-0.72

0.4707

-1.22

0.2228

1.13

0.2566

0.31

0.7598

-0.44

0.6586

0.26

0.7968

Table 16b: Results of two-tailed t-test comparing responses from respondents
defined as both captains and permit/vessel owners and all other roles
Role
Captain and Owner
Others
Captain and Owner
Longer Fishing Season
Others
Captain and Owner
Bycatch/Discards
will decline
Others
Captain and Owner
Increased safety
Others
Captain and Owner
Increase profits due to
higher market prices
Others
Captain and Owner
Increase enforcement
Others
Captain and Owner
End the race for fish
Others
Captain and Owner
Effective means to
protect stocks
Others
Captain and Owner
Easier for new fishers
to enter the fisheries
Others
Captain and Owner
Reduce the number
of vessels
Others
Captain and Owner
Allow for more
sustainable practices
Others
Captain and Owner
Make management
more flexible
Others
Captain and Owner
Private property rights
is a good idea
Others
Captain and Owner
Consolidation is a
serious concern
Others
Captain and Owner
Increase job
opportunities
Others
Captain and Owner
Fairly allocate shares
among participants
Others
Captain and Owner
Participants will be
better off financially
Others
Captain and Owner
Prefer IFQ over
previous methods
Others
Captain and Owner
More fisheries should
be managed with IFQ
Others
* Significant Difference (α = 0.05)
Familiar with the
program

n

Mean

100
93
94
85
98
85
91
87
92
89
97
90
93
88
97
91
97
90
99
90
95
87
96
87
96
85
97
87
95
83
98
88
98
87
96
88
96
87

4.28
3.89
3.22
3.07
4.11
4.05
3.36
3.39
3.37
3.27
2.68
2.77
2.98
2.99
3.59
3.37
4.47
4.36
1.52
1.63
3.57
3.31
3.66
3.57
3.77
3.71
1.82
2.06
4.39
4.45
4.24
4.17
4.05
3.82
3.95
3.66
4.10
3.90
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Standard
Deviation
0.996
1.098
1.627
1.557
1.299
1.379
1.588
1.558
1.443
1.444
1.531
1.461
1.560
1.608
1.573
1.554
1.137
1.211
1.063
1.185
1.506
1.527
1.435
1.411
1.454
1.479
1.291
1.409
1.075
1.074
1.317
1.280
1.388
1.451
1.496
1.639
1.388
1.502

t-value

Degrees of
Freedom

p-value

2.571

191

0.011*

0.640

177

0.523

0.329

181

0.743

-0.119

176

0.905

0.465

179

0.642

-0.393

185

0.694

-0.043

179

0.966

0.938

186

0.350

0.691

185

0.490

-0.723

187

0.471

1.147

180

0.253

0.387

181

0.699

0.298

179

0.766

-1.169

182

0.244

-0.349

176

0.728

0.390

184

0.697

1.125

183

0.262

1.249

182

0.213

0.972

181

0.332

Discussion

Affiliation with the Grouper and Tilefish Fisheries

The largest differences between responses to the closed ended questions
can be seen when comparing those from IFQ participants with non-IFQ
participants. Out of the 22 questions that were analyzed, 21 were determined to
have statistically significant differences, meaning that most of the answers
provided by IFQ participants were statistically significantly different from those
provided by respondents who are not participants in the grouper and tilefish IFQ.
When asked whether or not respondents see the IFQ program as an
improvement over previous management methods, IFQ participants had a lower
proportion of yes responses than non-participants (z-value = -6.07,
p-value < 0.0001), indicating they see it less as an improvement than those who
do not participate in the fisheries. Similarly, non-IFQ participants were more
inclined to prefer the IFQ program over previous management methods (t 57.970 =
6.205, p-value = 0.000) and agree that more fisheries should be managed under
an IFQ system (t64.669 = 7.944, p-value = 0.000). These results indicate non-IFQ
participants have a more favorable view of the program because they see it as a
move in a positive direction in order to protect fisheries, whereas those
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participating in the program see it as a change that can possibly affect their
businesses and livelihoods.
Another point of distinction among IFQ participants and non-participants is
their opinion of distributing private property rights to a public resource, the
grouper and tilefish fisheries. IFQ participants were statistically significantly less
likely to agree that allocating property rights in the fisheries is a good idea
(t50.574 = 4.456, p-value = 0.000). Along the same lines, IFQ participants were
significantly more likely to disagree the shares would be fairly distributed among
the participants (t240 = 4.969, p-value = 0.000). Participants are more likely to be
reluctant to such allocation because they are losing what was once open access
to marine resources. Before the IFQ program began, fishers could go out to sea
and target grouper and tilefish on as many trips as they could, so long as the
season was open. But with the IFQ program, each fisher is given a set
allocation, thus restricting their total harvest. Those who used to make multiple
trips throughout the year may be restricted to one trip if they catch all their
allocation at once.
In addition to the closed ended questions found throughout the survey,
respondents had an opportunity to provide comments along with their
submissions. These comments provide a deeper understanding of concerns and
expectations. Allocation was a topic mentioned by a great number of commercial
fishers, many of which suggested the National Marine Fisheries Service should
“evenly divide the quota between all the fishermen.” Another common topic was
the selection of 1999-2004 as the qualifying years used to determine the IFQ
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shares and allocation. Some fishers openly expressed their frustration with the
years chosen because they did not own a permit during those years, so their
fishing practices are not reflected in the permit’s historical landings. Instead,
their allocation was based on historical fishing practices of the previous owner of
the permit.
“I purchased a reef permit in January 2009. The new program uses
data from back several years prior to ownership. I spent $7,000.00
for a permit and can’t use it for grouper.” – Commercial Fisher

A similar concern with the qualified years chosen included how a period of
inactivity affected the historical landings of a vessel.
“We had a year no fish due to fire and illness. They averaged that
year into the mix which reduced the IFQ substantially. How are we
to make a living?” – Commercial Fisher
“I wish we had more time to look at the timeline or had more
flexibility on the years that were chosen for qualifying. My best boat
was under construction for three years. So it had no catch history.
This caused my income to drop by 40%.” – Commercial Fisher

The majority of negative comments regarding allocation dealt with longline
vessels. Many respondents explained that longline vessels have the means to
“catch too many fish too fast,” giving them an advantage over other gear types.
Others indicated that longlines are the “most devastating method to the fishery”,
accounting for most of the overfishing in the grouper and tilefish fisheries, and yet
they are the ones being rewarded with higher allocations. Smaller operators
contend this is not fair.
“Long liners caused our problem. Now they will be rewarded with
the lion share of pounds. They are banning longlines in certain
areas because of high mortality and unhealthy fishing practices.
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How can NMFS reward them like this? This program is absurd,
unnecessary, and costly.” – Dealer

A number of survey questions were used to assess what respondents see
as the potential accomplishments and problems associated with the IFQ
program. A major concern of IFQ participants is consolidation of IFQ shares.
Participants were significantly more likely to agree that consolidation is a serious
concern than those not in the fisheries (t237 = -3.70, p-value = 0.000).
Consolidation of the fishery may be a concern to everyone because monopolies
in any market are seldom good, but IFQ participants are more worried because
they have the most at stake since their livelihoods are tied to fishery access.
They appear to believe that any potential reduction of their catch may put them
out of business.
Written comments received by both commercial fishers and dealers
indicate a feared decline in small businesses. This loss of small businesses can
affect a large number of people as well as create larger problems for entire
fishing communities.
“Putting a lot of fishermen out of work. Now only a few will have all
the IFQs. Now instead of 500 boats buying fuel, insurance, food,
tackle, 100 boats will take their place. Now more people will have
to find income. Just what this country needs, more people out of
work, looking for government assistance.” – Commercial Fisher
“Many small commercial fishermen who did not cause the problem
are being forced out of business or will be forced to be “sharecroppers” buying or leasing IFQ from those who caused the
problem. Small fishing communities are getting smaller and
poorer.” – Commercial Fisher
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Some respondents believe that a decline in small businesses may allow
the National Marine Fisheries Service “to give the big boats and big corporations
all the grouper,” thus resulting in consolidation of the IFQ shares. Although the
National Marine Fisheries Service implemented share and allocation caps to
prevent such consolidation, many participants are still concerned that larger
companies might buy enough shares to reach the cap, thus resulting in a number
of larger shareholders holding the maximum shares allowed. Many respondents
made clear that smaller boats and fish houses would go bankrupt, allowing
“larger operators to take over the fishery and markets.”
Other comments from IFQ participants referred to the potential for some
participants to simply sit on their shares and lease these rights to other fishers.
Some see this as a way for wealthy people to sit around and make money while
other people do the work. When asked about positive effects on the fisheries, a
dealer commented, “only for those fat cats that will sit at home and lease pounds
to hardworking fishermen.” To IFQ participants, these “arm chair” fishermen are
just another step closer to consolidating the IFQ shares into fewer and fewer
wealthy hands.
Another problem expected by the IFQ participants is the likely difficulty for
new fishers to enter the grouper and tilefish fisheries. Participants were
significantly more likely to disagree with the statement that it will be easier for
new fishers to enter the commercial fisheries (t242 = 2.421, p-value = 0.016).
Those involved in the fishery have a good understanding of how the industry
works and what it requires to succeed. Current commercial fishers know that
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new fishers will have a much harder time trying to make a living in these fisheries
because they understand the burdens associated with obtaining a proper vessel,
permits, and, in the case of the IFQ program, an adequate allocation of fish.
Some commercial fishers claim the IFQ program “screws the new generation of
fishermen.”
The fear of consolidation and difficulty of new fishers entering the fishery
is not a concern in only the Gulf of Mexico grouper and tilefish IFQ program. As
previously discussed, many studies of IFQ programs demonstrate a common
theme among the study subjects. Stewart et al. (2006) and Dolsak & Ostrom
(2003) both demonstrate how some fishers fear that the fishing industry may
become concentrated in the hands of a few large companies. McCay (2008),
Branch and Hilborn (2008), and Dewees (2008) also discuss the effects of IFQ
programs on new fishers and how consolidation of shares makes it more difficult
for them to gain entry into the fishery.
Additional written comments indicate that the required online system
poses enormous problems for many IFQ participants. In order to participate in
the IFQ program, fishers and dealers must use a free online account to monitor
and report their landings. However, some people do not have access to a
computer, let alone the internet. Even if they can get to a computer with internet
access, a lot of commercial fishers “don’t know how to operate a computer” or
navigate complex online systems. This puts some fishers at a great
disadvantage. These fishers must get outside help from others who may be
more knowledgeable on computers, such as family, friends, or their dealers.
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Even for some commercial fishers who know how to run a computer, the
requirement is still “redundant and time consuming, just more junk to take up
time and more bureaucracy.” Dealers are also concerned with the additional
burden associated with extra steps in doing business (i.e. entering information
into the online system).
“The small town I fish from doesn’t have DSL or cell service to
phone in notices. I will have to buy a computer and run phone lines
and pay for dial-up service just because of the IFQ program.”
– Commercial Fisher
The IFQ program’s alleged benefits are yet another point of disagreement
between those who participate in the fisheries and those who do not. When
asked about the IFQ program’s positive effects on fisheries, non-participants had
a higher proportion of yes responses than IFQ participants (z-value = -5.38,
p-value < 0.0001). More specifically, IFQ participants were less likely to agree
that the IFQ program is an effective means to protect grouper and tilefish stocks
(t59.264 = 6.203, p-value = 0.000), but more likely to agree that the IFQ program
will reduce the number of vessels available to fish for groupers and tilefish
(t244 = -2.171, p-value = 0.031). Non-participants argue that a reduction in fishing
vessels will help the fishery, but those in the fisheries tend to disagree because it
may mean one of their vessels can no longer fish, and thus, they would have no
way to make a living. They see a reduction in fishing vessels as a large problem.
Perspectives regarding IFQ programs of grouper and tilefish fishers in the
Gulf of Mexico seem to differ from those of fishers in New Zealand. Dewees
(1989) conducted a study in which he concluded that fishers saw their IFQ
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program as a way to reduce competition and actually viewed reduced effort as an
advantage of the program. Instead, Gulf of Mexico fishers generally do not see
the reduction in vessels as such. However, comments written by some IFQ
participants indicate that at least a few Gulf of Mexico fishers agree with their
brethren in New Zealand. Some respondents credit the IFQ program for giving
fishers a marketable resource which they can sell, profit from, or ultimately use
for retirement. To some fishers, a reduced fleet would be a good thing because
the IFQ provides some money to those who leave the fishery.
“I am of retirement age. I will be able to lease allocation to
fishermen who do not have sufficient catch so they will be more
productive and I can retire.” – Commercial Fisher

Other alleged benefits such as longer fishing seasons, decreased bycatch
and discards, and increased safety at sea appear to be contested by participants.
Non-IFQ participants were more inclined to agree that the IFQ program would
allow fishers to target grouper and tilefish for longer periods of the year
(t51.976 = 4.628, p-value = 0.000) because fishers are able to fish their given
allocation whenever they see fit. This also directly relates to increased safety at
sea. With more flexibility in when to go out, fishers can choose times which are
safer (i.e. avoid storms). IFQ Participants, however, were more likely to disagree
with this idea (t59.906 = 6.365, p-value = 0.000). Non-participants were also more
likely to agree that bycatch would decline under the IFQ program (t237 = 5.139,
p-value = 0.000). Similarly, IFQ participants were more likely to disagree when
asked whether the IFQ program would increase job opportunities (t228 = 4.764,
p-value = 0.000). Non-participants were more likely to agree than IFQ
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participants that the program would end the race for the fish (t57.281 = 4.939,
p-value = 0.000). Non-participants also agreed profits would increase, yet
participants were significantly more likely to disagree (t65.155 = 5.844,
p-value = 0.000). Non-participants are able to see the larger picture of the
potential impacts IFQ programs can have on fisheries. With this more broad
perspective, they are more likely to expect these outcomes in the grouper and
tilefish IFQ program specifically.
The potential increase in both bycatch and poaching was a prevalent topic
in written comments from participants. According to them, fishers will have to
resort to poaching (i.e. fishing without allocation) just to provide for their families
and pay bills. As fishers point out, they are not criminals, but may feel driven to
“cheat” in order to survive.
“This will turn honest fishermen into poachers when the bills are
due. Not because they want to but because the mortgage is due.
Most of us are older. We don’t have skills for other jobs even if they
were available.” – Commercial Fisher

Similarly, some argue that discard mortality will increase because many
fishers will not have enough allocation to cover what they catch and thus would
have to throw fish back into the water that are likely to die anyway. According to
one commercial fisher, “Twice the fish will be caught before the quota can be
filled due to bycatch being thrown to the sharks.” An increase in bycatch is also a
problem in IFQ programs in other regions of the world. As discussed earlier, the
two studies by Dewees (1998, 2008) conducted in 1995 and 2008 demonstrate
that fishers are concerned with bycatch and highgrading.
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Comments from non-IFQ participants, including those in academia and
government agencies varied extensively. Some claimed that the IFQ program
will “stop derby fishing” while others argued that the “grouper and tilefish fisheries
are not currently in a derby race for the fish” but contend that the IFQ program
could “reduce the likelihood of such a derby ever developing”. While some nonparticipants claim the IFQ program makes it harder for new fishers by “costing
them more to enter the fishery or increase their take”, others argued that the
program “provides a benefit to those who are able to sell their shares when they
leave the fishery”, thus providing income fishers can use as they transition to
another livelihood.
Most non-IFQ participants who commented agree that the program allows
“greater control of take” by providing “more accurate landings data”, thus
providing opportunities for better management. Non-IFQ participants agreed that
the program has the potential to save the fisheries from “decline and eventual
collapse” and ultimately increasing stocks. Moreover, the IFQ program helps
ensure better data is collected because there is an increase in dockside
monitoring and required input from both fishers and dealers. This leaves less
room for cheating and accidental misreporting.
“IFQ programs are accompanied by reporting and monitoring
requirements that leave an increased paper trail and improve the
ability for dockside enforcement rather than having to rely on
intercepting violators at-sea.” – Government Agent

Non-IFQ participants are more supportive and positive about the grouper
and tilefish IFQ program overall. These results support the hypothesis that those
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involved in the fisheries would have a more negative outlook on the IFQ program
because they are the ones who are more directly affected by the new
regulations. The commercial fishers and dealers are the ones who will have to
cope with new burdens created by the IFQ program. Those who do not
participate in the fisheries don’t have to adjust their work lives in order to account
for the latest laws.
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Size of Operation

Comparing responses based on size of operation pointed out several
significant differences between large and small scale fishers. Generally
speaking, smaller operations tended to have a more negative view of the IFQ
program than those with larger operations. Specifically, large operators had
higher proportion of yes responses to the statement that the IFQ program is an
improvement over previous management methods (z-value = 4.20,
p-value < 0.0001), and they were statistically significantly more likely to prefer the
program over previous management methods (t73.835 = -3.864, p-value = 0.000).
Similarly, larger operations were also more inclined to agree that more fisheries
should be managed under IFQ programs (t75.502 = -3.099, p-value = 0.003).
Small scale fishers, however, had lower proportions of yes responses regarding
expected positive effects on both their own operations (z-value = 6.23,
p-value < 0.0001) and fisheries in general (z-value = 3.64, p-value = 0.0003).
Large scale operators see more potential accomplishments of the IFQ
program than smaller operators. They were more likely to agree with ideas such
as a longer fishing season (t164 = -2.261, p-value = 0.025), more job opportunities
(t69.716 = -2.987, p-value = 0.004), increased safety at sea (t160 = -4.207,
p-value = 0.000), and increased profits (t81.235 = -2.601, p-value = 0.011). On the
other hand, small operations were more likely to disagree that the program would
end the race for fish (t163 = -2.981, p-value = 0.003) and allow participants to be
better off financially (t73.868 = -3.307, p-value = 0.001). Larger scale operators
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were also more likely to agree that the IFQ would increase enforcement
(t169 = -3.801, p-value = 0.000).
In terms of the fisheries themselves, large operations were more likely to
agree with the statement indicating the program would lead to decreased bycatch
(t80.849 = -2.228, p-value = 0.029) as well as the IFQ program as an effective
means to protect stocks (t170 = -3.516, p-value = 0.001). Small operations are
more likely to disagree that the program would allow fishers to participate in more
sustainable fishing practices and make more sustainable decisions (t165 = -4.082,
p-value = 0.000) or make management of the grouper and tilefish fisheries more
flexible (t165 = -3.695, p-value = 0.000).
When asked about whether they expect negative effects of the IFQ
program, small scale fishers had a higher proportion of yes responses than larger
operators, indicating they expect more detrimental effects than their larger
counterparts (z-value = -3.34, p-value = 0.0008). In addition, small operators
were also less inclined to agree that allocating private property rights is a good
idea (t164 = -3.359, p-value = 0.001). Small operations were more likely to
disagree that it would be easier for new fishers to enter the grouper and tilefish
fisheries (t77.915 = -2.017, p-value = 0.047).
Overall, small scale fishers were statistically significantly more inclined to
be less familiar with the IFQ program than larger fishing operations. This could
be the result of lack of financial resources. For instance, the National Marine
Fisheries Service held a number of public workshops around the Gulf of Mexico.
However, they were not able to attend every city, so some fishers and dealers
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had to travel in order to attend these workshops. If small scale fishers didn’t
have the financial means to travel, they may not have been able to attend. On
the other hand, larger fishing operations most likely earn more money and can
afford to travel to attend the informational meetings.
Smaller scale operations are more reluctant to embrace the IFQ program
because they will receive a lower allocation, preventing them from catching as
many grouper and tilefish as their larger counterparts. They believe they will be
losing access to a resource that was once open access and they could utilize as
much as they pleased. With implementation of the IFQ, their options are limited
and they feel like they are being excluded from accessing a public resource. This
makes them wary about the potential benefits and problems associated with the
program. They are more prone to be worried about whether or not they will be
able to continue participating in the fisheries due to little or no allocation. Without
sufficient allocation, they might not be able to fish for grouper or tilefish in the
Gulf of Mexico, thus potentially leaving them with no source of income on which
to survive.

92

Gear Type

Analysis of gear type and its influence on how commercial fishers view the
IFQ program is divided into four separate analyses (spear vs. others, longline vs.
others, handline vs. others, and bandit vs. others). In the survey, only
commercial fishers indicated a gear type since they are the only participants who
actively use any gear to harvest grouper and tilefish. As such, responses from
dealers and non-IFQ participants are not reflected in these results. In the
analysis, mean responses from fishers using each gear type were compared to
those from all other gear type users.
Responses of fishers using spear compared to all others showed the most
significant differences than other comparisons. Spear fishers were less likely to
agree that fishers would be better off financially under the IFQ program
(t29.224 = 6.351, p-value = 0.000). Respondents of other gear types were more
inclined to agree that bycatch would decrease (t26.541 = 5.537, p-value = 0.000),
job opportunities would increase (t168 = 7.256, p-value = 0.000), and IFQ shares
would be fairly allocated among participants (t176 = 8.395, p-value = 0.000).
Spear fishers were also less likely to agree with the statement that the IFQ
program is an effective means to protect the grouper and tilefish stocks
(t9.140 = 2.425, p-value = 0.038) and end the race for fish (t10.108 = 4.552,
p-value = 0.001). Meanwhile, fishers using other gear types were more inclined
to agree that the program allows fishers to make more sustainable decisions in
their fishing practices (t9.985 = 3.238, p-value = 0.009).
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Spear fishers may have a more negative outlook on the IFQ program
when compared to users of all other gear types because there are few people
using this gear type, relative to other types. With such a selective and labor
intensive gear type, spear fishers may see the program as an increase in
restrictions, thus providing less flexibility to operate as they have in the past.
Another possible point of concern for spear fishers is consolidation. Since
allocation is based on historical landings, they will not receive as many shares as
users of other gear types. While their allocation may be enough to maintain their
own harvest levels, they may be concerned with others gaining an unfair access
to the grouper and tilefish fisheries, thus concentrating a large portion of the
market in fewer hands.
Unlike spear fishers, longline fishers usually have a much higher landings
history. Their differences with others are reflected in survey responses. Longline
fishers have a more positive outlook on the IFQ program. They had a higher
proportion of yes responses regarding positive effects on their personal
operations (z-value = 2.31, p-value = 0.0207) and agree that fishers would be
better off financially under the IFQ program (t183 = -2.999, p-value = 0.003).
Longline fishers were also more inclined to agree that allocating private property
rights in the grouper and tilefish fishery is a good thing (t179 = -2.281,
p-value = 0.024) and that the allocation would be divided fairly (t22.963 = -2.098,
p-value = 0.047). In terms of managing the Gulf of Mexico grouper and tilefish
fisheries, longline fishers were more likely to agree the IFQ program would
provide more flexibility in management (t181 = -2.593, p-value = 0.010) as well as
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preferring IFQ management over alternative management methods (t182 = -2.275,
p-value = 0.024).
With a higher landings history, a fisher is allocated a greater number of
shares and thus can catch more grouper and tilefish. A higher allocation results
in more revenue, causing a positive opinion of the IFQ program. Longline fishers
are less likely to see the program as a threat to their livelihoods and as a result
are more supportive of the program.
Comparing responses from both handline and bandit gear fishers to the
others did not result in many significant differences. Bandit fishers are more
likely to agree than fishers using any other gear type that the IFQ program will
end the race for fish (t179 = -2.432, p-value = 0.016) while handline fishers are
less inclined to agree that more fisheries should be managed under an IFQ
system (t158.010 = 1.974, p-value = 0.050). When considering potential
accomplishments of the program, handline fishers were more likely to disagree
with the statement that enforcement would increase (t185 = 2.265,
p-value = 0.025) or that the allocation would be fairly distributed among
participants (t163.975 = 2.335, p-value = 0.0210).
Responses from handline fishers reflect a more negative outlook than
users of all other gear types combined. Like spear fishing, landings using
handline aren’t very high compared to some other gear types. Despite the
potential for fish prices to increase, fishers (particularly smaller scale operators)
are still concerned over a decrease in their allowable catch. While some could
argue the increase in price per pound may offset the lost income of a decrease in
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harvest (i.e. higher prices for fewer fish), other fishers don’t believe the increase
in price per pound is high enough to balance out losses due to a decline in
harvest. Operating a vessel, including fuel, bait, and ice, is expensive and must
be covered on less harvest. Anything that poses a threat to one’s profit is rarely
viewed favorably. While some could argue that allocation reflects historic harvest
levels, fishers still perceive the IFQ program as an increase in regulations, and a
potential loss in flexibility. Regardless of whether or not allocation given to each
fisher under the IFQ program accurately corresponds to past harvest, fishers
may still have a negative outlook. This negative outlook may be a result of their
fear of losing what they think is sufficient access to the grouper and tilefish
fisheries in the Gulf of Mexico.
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Role within the Grouper and Tilefish Fisheries

Comparison of responses from different roles within the grouper and
tilefish fisheries showed the least amount of divergence. As previously
explained, analysis consisted of comparing each role (captain, permit/vessel
owner, and both captain and permit/vessel owner) to the other two lumped into
an “others” category. The results comparing statistically significant differences
between captains vs. all others indicate that captains are significantly less likely
to agree with the statement that it will be easier for new fishers to enter the
grouper and tilefish fisheries (t23.462 = 2.217, p-value = 0.037). Captains are also
more inclined to disagree that allocating private property rights to the public
fisheries is a good idea (t15.997 = 2.230, p-value = 0.040).
Comparisons of familiarity of the grouper and tilefish IFQ program resulted
in statistically significant differences between permit/vessel owners vs. others as
well as those considered both owners and captains. This may be the result of
obtaining information through the mail as the permit holder. Whenever the
National Marine Fisheries Service sends out information about the IFQ program,
both before and after implementation, the information gets mailed to the address
on record as belonging to the permit owner. If a fisher is only a captain, they
may miss out on a lot of vital information that permit owners receive in the mail.
Generally speaking, however, all three groups have a negative position on
the IFQ program. All three groups disagreed that bycatch will be reduced and
safety at sea will improve. They also disagree that shares will be fairly allocated
but agree that consolidation is a serious problem within the fishery, despite the
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caps on shares and allocation. According to all three groups, job opportunities
will not increase and industry participants will not be financially better off under
the IFQ program as opposed to previous management methods.
Those who are solely captains have a completely different stake in the
commercial fisheries than those who own a permit and vessel. Captains often
rely on the vessel owner for a job and thus tend to have a different perspective
on the IFQ program (i.e. more statistical significant differences) because they
have less say in the outcome and could potentially lose their job. On the other
hand, those who are permit owners or both captain and permit owners are more
secure in their position and thus have a more positive outlook on the IFQ
program.
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Conclusions

There have been a number of studies on the biological effectiveness of
IFQ programs but there are few studies which have evaluated the social
component of these management measures prior to implementation. This study
provides insight into how stakeholders perceive IFQ programs and their
effectiveness. Overall, the results indicate that people who are directly impacted
by the IFQ program have a much different outlook on the potential benefits and
problems associated with the IFQ program than respondents who do not actively
participate in the program. Participants see the IFQ program as a threat to their
businesses and way of life. With the implementation of the IFQ program,
commercial fishers and dealers must adjust their business practices in order to
comply with new regulations. Non-participants, however, see no change in their
lives as a result of the program. Their day-to-day lives are not directly affected
by the changes in rules. Permit holders and other participants in the IFQ
program are more involved in the day-to-day procedures of the fisheries. Fishery
managers see the larger picture of fishing activities and their impacts on the
grouper and tilefish stocks.
Respondents expressed concern over a number of problems. Some of
the largest problems expected by respondents were consolidation and the ease
of which new fishers can enter the grouper and tilefish fisheries. Each group
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suggested that it would be harder for new fishers to enter the fishery. In addition,
commercial fishers, regardless of role, size of operation, or gear type, expressed
additional concerns, including an increase in bycatch and a decrease in job
opportunities. An increase in bycatch poses a serious problem for fish stocks
because it would increase mortality. A loss of job opportunities is harmful to the
industry, including commercial fishers and dealers. Such losses may result in the
decimation of fishing communities around the Gulf of Mexico. Commercial
fishers are also concerned over the distribution of IFQ shares. They believe the
shares will not be fairly distributed among IFQ participants, thus providing some
fishers with an advantage over others.
One aspect of the IFQ program that is not expected to pose a large
problem to IFQ participants is the online system. As discussed before, the IFQ
program requires the use of a free online system in which fishers and dealers
record landings. Some commercial fishers or dealers may be inconvenienced
but the majority of participants did not express a concern over the online system.
The National Marine Fisheries Service anticipates the Gulf of Mexico
grouper and tilefish IFQ program will provide a number of benefits to fish stocks
as well as IFQ participants, including increased safety at sea, enforcement,
profits, and an end to the race for fish. Not all respondents, however, agree with
fishery managers’ expectations. Non-participants were more likely to expect an
improvement in safety at sea. Spear fishers, handline fishers, and small scale
operators disagree with such expectations. The other groups, on the other hand,
were uncertain. Similarly, only non-participants and large scale fishers were
100

likely to agree that the IFQ program would end the race for the fish. Spear
fishers disagreed and the others were not convinced either way. Longline
fishers, large operations, and non-participants expected an increase in
enforcement while the others were not as certain. Non-participants were most
likely to agree that profits would increase whereas spear fishers, handline fishers,
and boat captains disagreed. The other groups reflected less certain opinions.
Additionally, fishery managers hope to reduce fishing effort and
overcapitalization within the fisheries. Respondents from each group agree that
the IFQ program would reduce the number of vessels available to fish for grouper
and tilefish. Whether or not each group sees the reduction as a good thing is
another matter. However, fewer vessels harvesting grouper and tilefish is,
indeed, a reduction in effort and overcapitalization. Fishery managers also hope
that the IFQ program is an effective means to protect the fish stocks but only
non-IFQ participants were likely to agree. Handline and spear fishers, small
operations, and fishers who are both boat captain and owner disagree that the
program effectively manages the stocks while the rest of the groups are
uncertain. Overall, when asked if the IFQ program is an improvement over other
management methods, large scale fishers and non-IFQ participants were more
likely to say yes.
Integrating the impacts of regulations on fishers and fishing communities
is an important component of fishery management. Fishing communities have a
strong cultural foundation in which those in the industry highly value their work
place autonomy. Fishers and dealers alike, cherish their freedom and ability to
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work as they see fit. Regulations are often seen as obstacles to living their lives
as they want. For this reason, it is of great benefit for fishery managers to have a
better understanding of the social perceptions of IFQ programs. With more
insight into these perspectives, fishery managers can be conscious of the
impacts of IFQ programs and perhaps design better management strategies that
allow fishing communities to decide how to reduce their impact on fisheries.
The results of this study will help fishery managers to make more informed
decisions regarding management methods to sustain the resource. My findings
can allow managers an inside look at what stakeholders, especially commercial
fishers, believe IFQ programs will accomplish. This will make development of
new programs in other fisheries easier because fishery managers will have an
idea of what is perceived to be successful and what is not.
Using the information in this study, fishery managers can focus outreach
and education on the areas of most concern to stakeholders. For instance, the
outcry over the chosen qualifying years (1999-2004) can be addressed by
providing better explanations of how and why those years were chosen.
Similarly, a clear explanation of how allocation was divided among participants
and why that method was chosen would be helpful. The Gulf Reef Fish
Amendment 29, which designed and implemented the IFQ program, explains the
reasoning behind the selection and design but few, if any, IFQ participants have
read the entire 300-page document.
The National Marine Fisheries Service has provided a number of user
friendly documents, such as answers to frequently asked questions and fishery
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bulletins, and they have conducted workshops throughout the Gulf of Mexico
region. Their efforts to reach out to the public have been extensive but some
argue that the language used in documents is hard to understand. Results from
this study suggest that the National Marine Fisheries Service should focus their
attention on controversial topics and try to relieve some tension and fears faced
by the fishing community.
In terms of stakeholder perspectives of potential benefits (i.e. decrease in
bycatch or increase in profits) or problems (i.e. consolidation and decreased job
opportunities) generated by the IFQ program, it is hard to change the way people
feel about certain topics. However, the National Marine Fisheries Service can
provide better examples of how IFQ programs have worked in other fisheries. By
providing examples of what worked and what did not may alleviate the public’s
fears. Without widespread support of a management method, efforts to protect
fishery stocks are less likely to be effective, thus perpetuating the enormous
problems facing fish species all over the world.
The outcome of this study helped bring to light new perspectives on the
social implications of the IFQ program. Prior to this study, there were a number
of analyses explaining the impacts of such programs on the biological aspects of
fisheries management. However, few research projects take into account the
impact such programs have on commercial fishers and dealers, and neglecting
how smaller vessels or dealers would be impacted. The survey responses and
statistical analyses performed in this study provide a fresh outlook on the grouper
and tilefish IFQ program in the Gulf of Mexico. It also points out the importance
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of compromises (i.e. selecting a less restrictive regulation to protect fishers, such
as a traditional limited access permit system) that may have to be made in order
to find a delicate balance between protecting both fisheries and fishing
communities.
This study suffers from some limitations. First, the response rate is
relatively low. Most mail-in surveys have a low response rate due to the
detached, voluntary nature of such a survey. To improve the response rate,
follow-up letters could have been sent to remind survey participants to complete
and mail in their responses. However, due to funding limitations, follow-up letters
were not a possibility. Another possible solution to the low response rate would
be to include a token of appreciation, such as a one dollar bill as a way to let
respondents know how much their input is appreciated. Similarly, however, such
tokens of appreciation were not possible due to funding limitations. The
response rate may have been further improved if there was a way to contact boat
captains as well as permit holders. However, the National Marine Fisheries
Service does not monitor or record information for captains so there was no way
to identify and contact them. A problem associated with the low response rate is
the potential for misrepresentation of some stakeholder groups. The majority of
responses came from reef fish permit holders so other groups were not equally
represented.
Another weakness was discovered during analysis. When trying to recode data for the size of operation, it became evident that the choices provided in
the survey did not align with the Gulf Council’s definition of “substantial
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participation”. To better reflect the Council’s definition (8,000 pounds or more),
the options provided for survey question 6c should have clearly divided the
options accordingly, instead of at 10,000 pounds. Despite these weaknesses,
however, the results from the survey are still useful to fishery managers because
they provide a window into the perceptions of both large and small scale
stakeholders in the grouper and tilefish fisheries.
The study also provides a great opportunity for future research. A project
that could result from this original study would be to survey Gulf IFQ participants
again at a later point in time. By asking similar questions years after the program
has had a chance to get established, fishery managers can gain further
information regarding how the opinions of participants have changed. This will
allow managers to determine if the program is a success and whether or not it is
gaining more support as it progresses. A deeper look into stakeholder opinions
can provide more guidance on how to improve future IFQ programs.
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Appendix A (Continued)
Dear [NAME],
My name is Britni Tokotch and I am a graduate student in Environmental Science
and Policy at the University of South Florida St. Petersburg. For my master’s thesis,
I am conducting a study regarding your perceptions towards the upcoming Individual
Fishing Quota (IFQ) program in the Gulf of Mexico Grouper and Tilefish fisheries.
Specifically, I am interested in attitudes of important stakeholders in the Grouper and
Tilefish fisheries, and how these stakeholders perceive the management of fisheries
through an IFQ program.
Enclosed is a short survey that asks a variety of questions about your expectations
for the IFQ program in terms of the effects on fish populations, enforcement,
bycatch, and fishing communities. Please take a few minutes to answer these
questions. The survey should take no more than 7 minutes to complete and I have
enclosed a self-addressed and stamped envelope for your convenience.
Participation is entirely voluntary and there are no direct benefits or risks to you for
participating. Your responses will remain confidential and securely locked at all
times. Results will be reported in my master’s thesis and perhaps an academic
journal article without the names of any participants.
It is important that you participate to ensure that this research will reflect the views of
all stakeholders. So, please fill out the questionnaire and mail it today. If you own
multiple permits and received this survey multiple times, I would really appreciate it if
you would please pass it on to your captains.
If you have any questions or concerns about completing the survey or about
participating in this study, you may contact me at 727-482-3573 or by e-mail at
btokotch@mail.usf.edu.

Sincerely,

Britni Tokotch
Environmental Science and Policy Masters Program
University of South Florida

111

Appendix A (Continued)

Gulf of Mexico Grouper and Tilefish Individual Fishing Quota (IFQ) Survey
1. What is your primary affiliation with the Gulf of Mexico Grouper and Tilefish fisheries?
Dealer

Commercial Fisher

Government Agency

Recreational Fisher

Environmental Group/NGO

Other: ___________

2. How familiar are you with the upcoming Gulf of Mexico Grouper/Tilefish IFQ program?
(Please circle only one)
1
Not at
all familiar

2
Barely
familiar

3
Somewhat
familiar

4
Fairly
familiar

5
Very
familiar

Please answer the following questions.
You may provide additional comments in the spaces provided.

3. Do you see the Grouper/Tilefish IFQ program as an improvement over current
management methods?
Yes

No

Comments:__________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________
4. Do you anticipate any positive effects of the IFQ program on the grouper and tilefish
fisheries?
Yes

No

Comments:__________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________
5. Do you anticipate any negative effects of the IFQ program on the grouper and tilefish
fisheries?
Yes

No

Comments:__________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________
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Appendix A (Continued)
Commercial Fishers:
6. Please answer the following questions:
a. What is the primary gear you use most to harvest grouper and tilefish in the
Gulf of Mexico?
Hand Line
Bandit
Longline
Buoy Gear
Other: ________
b. What is your job status with the Gulf of Mexico grouper and tilefish fisheries?
Captain
Permit/Vessel owner
Other: ________________
c. On average, how many pounds of grouper and tilefish (combined) did you
catch during the qualifying years for the IFQ program (1999-2004)?
Less than 1,000
20,001-30,000
60,001-70,000
1,000-5,000
30,001-40,000
70,001-80,000
5,001-10,000
40,001-50,000
80,001-90,000
10,001-20,000
50,001-60,000
Greater than 90,000
Commercial Fishers and Dealers:
7. Please answer the following questions:
a. The Grouper/Tilefish IFQ program requires the use of an online system using
the Internet. Will this requirement pose a problem to you or your operation?
Yes
No
Comments:
_____________________________________________________________
b. If you are not familiar with computers or expect to get help with the online
system requirement, who do you anticipate will help you (such as spouse,
child, or dealer)?
_____________________________________________________________
Commercial Fishers, Recreational Fishers, and Dealers
8. Please answer the following questions:
a. Do you anticipate any positive effects of the IFQ program on your personal
operations?
Yes
No
Comments:
_____________________________________________________________
b. Do you anticipate any negative effects of the IFQ program on your personal
operations?
Yes
No
Comments: ___________________________________________________
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Appendix A (Continued)
For the following statements, please use the following scale:
(Please circle only one)
1
Strongly Agree
2
Somewhat Agree
3
Undecided/Unsure
4
Somewhat Disagree
5
Strongly Disagree
N/A
Not Applicable
9. The IFQ program will allow fishers to harvest grouper or
tilefish for a longer period of the year.
10. Bycatch/Discards will decline under the IFQ program.
11. Fishing for grouper and tilefish will be safer under the IFQ
program.
12. The IFQ program will increase industry profits due to higher
market prices for grouper and tilefish species.
13. The IFQ program will increase enforcement as compared to
previous management measures.
14. The IFQ program will help end the race for fish in the grouper
and tilefish fisheries.
15. The IFQ program is an effective means to protect fish stocks.
16. It will be easier for new fishers to enter the grouper and
tilefish fisheries.
17. The IFQ program will reduce the number of vessels available
to fish for groupers and tilefish.
18. The IFQ program will allow fishers to participate in more
sustainable fishing practices and make more sustainable
decisions.
19. The IFQ program will make management of the grouper and
tilefish fisheries more flexible.
20. Allocating private property rights in the grouper and tilefish
fisheries using the IFQ program is a good idea.
21. Consolidation of IFQ shares is a serious concern.
22. The IFQ program will increase job opportunities.
23. The IFQ program will fairly allocate shares among the
participants.
24. IFQ participants (fishers and dealers) will be better off
financially under the IFQ program as compared to previous
management methods.
25. I prefer the IFQ program over previous management
methods.
26. More fisheries should be managed under IFQ programs.

1

2

3

4

5

N/A

1

2

3

4

5

N/A

1

2

3

4

5

N/A

1

2

3

4

5

N/A

1

2

3

4

5

N/A

1

2

3

4

5

N/A

1

2

3

4

5

N/A

1

2

3

4

5

N/A

1

2

3

4

5

N/A

1

2

3

4

5

N/A

1

2

3

4

5

N/A

1

2

3

4

5

N/A

1

2

3

4

5

N/A

1

2

3

4

5

N/A

1

2

3

4

5

N/A

1

2

3

4

5

N/A

1

2

3

4

5

N/A

1

2

3

4

5

N/A

In the space below, please provide any additional comments regarding IFQ programs in
general or the upcoming IFQ program in the Gulf of Mexico Grouper and Tilefish
fisheries.
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
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The following questions are for demographic purposes only.
All information provided will remain confidential.
27. In what city and state do you currently live? ________________________________
28. Are you male or female?
29. What year were you born?

Male

Female

___________________

30. Please specify how many people of each age group (including yourself) live in the
same
household:
____ Under 18

____ 18-35

____36-60

____ Over 60

31. Which of the following best describes you?
Asian
American Indian
Black or African American
Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander

Hispanic or Latino
White/Caucasian
Other: ___________________

32. What is the highest grade or level of school that you have completed?
Did not complete high school
High school diploma or equivalent
Some college, but no degree
Two-year college or technical school

Four-year college (BA or BS)
Some graduate work, but no degree
Graduate degree (MA, MS, Ph.D.)

33. Which of the following best describes your employment status?
Self-employed
Employed, Full-time
Employed, Part-time
Employed seasonally
Homemaker

Student
Retired
Currently Unemployed, seeking work
Not employed, not seeking work
Other: _________________________
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Q1. What is your primary affiliation with the Gulf of Mexico Grouper and Tilefish
fisheries?
1. Dealer
2. Commercial Fisher
3. Recreational Fisher
4. Government Agency
5. Environmental Group/NGO
6. Charterboat
7. Dealer and Commercial Fisher (1,2)
8. Commercial Fisher and Recreational Fisher (2,3)
9. Dealer, Commercial Fisher, and Recreational Fisher (1,2,3)
10. Commercial and Charterboat (2,6)
11. Dealer, Commercial Fisher, Restaurant
12. Recreational Fisher, Charterboat (3,6)
13. Vessel Owner/Seafood Market Owner
14. University Professor
15. Research Scientist
16. University Professor and Research Scientist
17. Recreational Fisher and Research Scientist
18. Previous federal employee
19. Unsure
20. Recreational Fisher and Fishing Rights Lobbyist
21. Other: _______________
Recoded into Different Variables for Analysis:
IFQ Participants (1, 2, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13)
Non- IFQ Participants (3, 4, 5, 6, 12, 14-20)
Q2. How familiar are you with the upcoming Gulf of Mexico Grouper/Tilefish IFQ
program?
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Not at all familiar
Barely familiar
Somewhat familiar
Fairly familiar
Very familiar

Q3. Do you see the Grouper/Tilefish IFQ program as an improvement over
current management
methods?
1. Yes
2. No
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Q4. Do you anticipate any positive effects of the IFQ program on the grouper and
tilefish fisheries?
1. Yes
2. No
Q5. Do you anticipate any negative effects of the IFQ program on the grouper
and tilefish fisheries?
1. Yes
2. No
Q6a. What is the primary gear you use most to harvest grouper and tilefish in the
Gulf of Mexico?
1. Hand Line/Rod and Reel
2. Bandit
3. Longline
4. Buoy Gear
5. Rod/Reel
6. Spear
7. Dive
8. Handline and Bandit (1,2)
9. Handline and Spear (1,6)
10. Handline, Bandit, and Rod/Reel (1,2,5)
11. Bandit and Longline (2,3)
12. Bandit and Rod/Reel (2,5)
13. Hand Line/Rod and Reel, Bandit, and Spear (1,2,6)
14. Electric Reel
15. Other: __________
Recoded into Different Variables for Analysis:
Handline (1, 9)
Bandit (2, 8, 10, 13, 14)
Spear (6, 7)
Longline (3, 11)
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Q6b. What is your job status with the Gulf of Mexico grouper and tilefish
fisheries?
1. Captain
2. Permit/Vessel owner
3. Both Captain and Permit/Vessel Owner
4. Captain, Permit/Vessel Owner, and Diver
5. Captain, Permit/Vessel Owner, and Crew
6. Captain, Permit/Vessel Owner, and Operator
7. Captain, Permit/Vessel Owner, and Restaurant
8. Captain, Permit/Vessel Owner, and Dealer
9. Dealer/Ex-Vessel Owner
10. Other: ________________
Recoded into Different Variables for Analysis:
Captain (1)
Permit/Vessel owner (2)
Both Captain and Permit/Vessel Owner (3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9)
Q6c. On average, how many pounds of grouper and tilefish (combined) did you
catch during the qualifying years for the IFQ program (1999-2004)?
1. Less than 1,000
2. 1,000-5,000
3. 5,001-10,000
4. 10,001-20,000
5. 20,001-30,000
6. 30,001-40,000
7. 40,001-50,000
8. 50,001-60,000
9. 60,001-70,000
10. 70,001-80,000
11. 80,001-90,000
12. Greater than 90,000
Recoded into Different Variables for Analysis:
Small (Less than or equal to 10,000 lbs) (1, 2, 3)
Large (Greater than 10,000 lbs) (4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12)
Q7a. The Grouper/Tilefish IFQ program requires the use of an online system
using the Internet. Will this requirement pose a problem to you or your
operation? If yes, what kind of problem?
1. Yes
2. No
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Q7b. If you are not familiar with computers or expect to get help with the online
system requirement, who do you anticipate will help you (such as spouse,
child, or dealer)?
1. Spouse
2. Child
3. Dealer
4. Friend
5. Employee
6. Hired Help
7. NOAA
8. Captain/Crew
9. Other Fishermen
10. No One
11. Unknown
12. Grandchild
13. Spouse and Captain/Crew (1,8)
14. Spouse, Child, and Dealer (1,2,3)
15. Spouse and Dealer (1,3)
16. Spouse and Child (1,2)
17. Dealer and Hired Help (3,6)
18. Child and Dealer (2,3)
19. Spouse and Friend (1,4)
20. Dealer and Captain/Crew (3,8)
21. Dealer and Friend (3,4)
22. Spouse and Grandchild (1, 12)
Recoded into Different Variables for Analysis:
Family/Friends (1, 2, 4, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 18, 19, 21, 22)
Hired Help (5, 6, 8, 17, 20)
Industry (3, 9, 14, 15, 17, 18, 20, 21)

Q8a. Do you anticipate any positive effects of the IFQ program on your personal
operations?
1. Yes
2. No
Q8b. Do you anticipate any negative effects of the IFQ program on your personal
operations?
1. Yes
2. No
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For Questions 9-26, removed “6 (N/A)” and used the following scale for analysis
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Strongly Agree
Somewhat Agree
Undecided/Unsure
Somewhat Disagree
Strongly Disagree

Q27a. In what city do you currently live?
Q27b. In what state do you currently live?
Q28. Are you male or female?
1. Male
2. Female
Q29. What year were you born?
Q30. Please specify how many people of each age group (including yourself) live
in the same household:
Q30a: Under 18
Q30b: 18-35
Q30c: 36-60
Q30d: Over 60
Q31. Which of the following best describes you?
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Asian
Hispanic or Latino
American Indian
White/Caucasian
Black or African American
Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander
Greek American
American Indian and White/Caucasian (3,4)
Other: ____________________________
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Q32. What is the highest grade or level of school that you have completed?
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Did not complete high school
High school diploma or equivalent
Some college, but no degree
Two-year college or technical school
Four-year college (BA or BS)
Some graduate work, but no degree
Graduate degree (MA, MS, Ph.D.)

Q33. Which of the following best describes your employment status?
1. Self-employed
2. Employed, Full-time
3. Employed, Part-time
4. Employed seasonally
5. Homemaker
6. Student
7. Retired
8. Currently Unemployed, seeking work
9. Not employed, not seeking work
10. Self Employed Full-time (1,2)
11. Self Employed and Retired (1,7)
12. Owner/Operator Fisherman
13. Scientist, Educator
14. Employed Full-time and Student
15. Employed Part-time and Student
16. Other
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